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61 
RETHINKING THE HOMEOWNERSHIP 
SOCIETY: RENTAL STABILITY 
ALTERNATIVE 
By Arlo Chase* 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than 85 years, the United States government has 
promoted homeownership through mortgage programs, tax 
subsidies and popular rhetoric. The exhortations of 
homeownership became even more pronounced throughout the 
1990s and this decade. President George W. Bush’s campaign 
for the “Ownership Society”1 represented the culmination of this 
                                                          
*Associate Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Senior 
Vice President for Policy Initiatives, New York State Housing Finance 
Agency/State of New York Mortgage Agency. The opinions expressed herein 
are mine alone and do not represent those of my employers. I would like to 
thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions: 
Susanna Kohn, Oscar Chase, David Reiss, Christopher Serkin, Lee Ann 
Fennell, Robert Ellickson, Martin Kohn and Vicki Been. I would also like to 
thank the staff of The Journal of Law and Policy for their helpful editing. 
Moira Skeados provided able and much appreciated research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Robert J. Schiller, American Casino, ATLANTIC, Mar. 2005, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200503/shiller (detailing former 
President George W. Bush’s proposed “ownership society,” which planned to 
let people “own” their Social Security contributions, in the form of personal 
retirement accounts; “own” their health care, through portable health savings 
accounts; and own their homes in greater numbers, through bigger 
homeowner subsidies, noting that such proposals would encourage individual 
saving, but also increase the risk to which most American households would 
be subject); see also Greg Ip et al., Housing Bust Fuels Blame Game, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2008 (quoting President George W. Bush as stating, as part 
of the “ownership society” that, “we want everybody in America to own 
their own home”). 
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push for homeownership. While there are arguments to be made 
in favor of facilitating homeownership for qualified households, 
in recent decades such promotion went beyond qualified 
households and thereby helped fuel a housing bubble that 
ultimately burst, resulting in a severe economic recession and 
the foreclosure of millions of households. For the past 30 years, 
government programs and resources have largely ignored the 
other dominant tenure form—renting.2 This neglect of rental 
housing and rental households has helped create a troubling 
situation in which nearly half of all rental households spend 
more than the government recommends on housing,3 putting 
such households at risk of having insufficient resources for other 
necessities like food, medical care, transportation and education. 
The current housing crisis offers a historical opportunity to 
assess our national and local housing policies.4 In sum, the 
continued focus on homeownership, to the exclusion of renting, 
is in need of immediate revision. A policy shift is in order—
government needs to direct immediate attention and increased 
resources to rental housing. Such a shift would belatedly 
acknowledge the fact that, notwithstanding the last eight decades 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Clean Benson, Building a Better Public Housing Policy, 
CONG. Q. (July 17, 2009) available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage. 
cfm?parm1=1&docID=news-000003168984 at 1–2 (quoting Bruce Katz, 
stating that for the past eight years “[w]e had a really imbalanced housing 
policy, not just in the private sector, but in the public sector, toward 
homeownership”); see also Ip et al. supra note 1 (quoting Richard Styron, 
former CEO of Freddie Mac stating “[w]e went crazy as a country with the 
goals, saying everybody’s got to have a house”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
3 See infra Section IV.AB. 
4 See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, A Time for Bold Thinking on Housing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 4 (arguing that the current housing price 
downturn indicates a need for innovation in housing, including better 
management of risk); Press Release, Nat’l Found. for Credit Counseling, 
Survey Reveals Long-Term Implications of Mortgage Meltdown (June 23, 
2009), available at http://www.nfcc.org/NewsRoom/newsreleases/files09/ 
HomeownershipSurvey.pdf (finding that popular attitudes about benefits of 
homeownership have changed dramatically in the wake of the foreclosure 
crisis). 
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and hundreds of billions of dollars encouraging and subsidizing 
homeownership, almost one third of the households in the U.S. 
currently rent, and at least 95% of all Americans rent at some 
point in their lives.5 Specifically, additional resources and 
programs are needed which promote opportunities for increased 
rental stability and affordability. The need for these changes is 
evidenced by (i) the excess demand for rental housing compared 
with supply which has resulted in the affordability crisis for so 
many rental households;6 and (ii) the number of households that 
have overstretched their budgets in order to buy homes they 
could not afford, often because the rental options available to 
them were simply not stable and/or affordable enough.7   
To address this increasingly untenable situation, I propose a 
rental stability program that would offer tenants an option for 
longer lease terms, rights to lease renewal, temporary regulation 
of rent increases, and federal rental subsidies to cover rent 
increases for rent-burdened low and moderate income 
households.8 My proposal is essentially a modest one that 
provides renters with additional opportunities for stable tenancy 
and time limited price protection, while maintaining market-
based incentives for owners to create new rental housing units 
and maintain existing ones.   
A brief review of our current national housing policy—
provided in Part I of this article—will set the stage for the 
reforms urged herein. I rely on existing literature for both Part I 
and Part II, in which I examine the extraordinary societal 
                                                          
5 See Bruce Katz & Margery Austin Turner, Rethinking U.S. Rental 
Housing Policy, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/ 
papers/2007/0228metropolitanpolicy_katz_Opp08.aspx; see also WILLIAM 
APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING THE ABILITY OF RENTAL 
HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY 
1 (Dec. 2004) http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf 
[hereinafter “Apgar 2004”]. 
6 See infra Section IV.A. 
7 See infra Section IV.B. 
8 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV 
1047, 1059 (2008) (“Longer and better leaseholds and reform of 
homeownership’s tax advantages are worthy goals . . . .”). 
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benefits afforded to promote homeownership and the reasons 
typically given for them. I discuss several poignant studies that 
raise serious concerns about the degree to which U.S. policies 
promoting homeownership actually serve the stated goals of 
household and neighborhood stability. Currently, it must be 
acknowledged, the immensity of the homeownership subsidies 
provided is matched only by the immensity of the devastation 
wrought on individual households and surrounding communities 
by the current foreclosure crisis. In Part II, I integrate the 
findings of several housing studies to argue that the goals 
underlying the homeownership push can be met equally by 
enhanced rental stability.  
In Part III, I briefly review the enormously destabilizing 
effects of the foreclosure crisis on both individuals and 
communities. This leads into what I consider to be my real 
contribution to the existing literature: Part IV in which I lay out 
the factual case for expending more government resources and 
creating new legal protections for renters. Part V details the 
components of my proposed rental stability program and a 
discussion of how it serves my goal. That goal is to create 
increased opportunities for renters to obtain some meaningful 
measure of security in their tenure while avoiding excessive 
distortions in the rental market. I also evaluate the likely effects 
of my proposed program and respond to some likely critiques. 
Finally, in Part VI I examine three distinct recent policy 
proposals to addressing the housing crisis. 
I. U.S. HOUSING POLICY IS SKEWED TO HOMEOWNERSHIP 
A. History 
Since the Great Depression, our national housing policy has 
been primarily aimed at increasing homeownership.9 These 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Anthony Downs, Why Rental Housing Is the Neglected Child 
of American Shelter in RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 78 (2008) [hereinafter 
Downs, Why]; see also ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 48 (2006); Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, 
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efforts included the development of the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) homeownership loan programs, which guarantee up to 
90% of the value of a home as collateral for loans from private 
banks.10 Another Depression Era creation, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, more commonly known as Fannie Mae, 
began in 1968 to offer similar mortgage guarantees to a broader 
cross section of Americans.11 In 1990 the Federal Home 
Mortgage Corporation, otherwise known as Freddie Mac, began 
to offer similar products as those of Fannie Mae.12 Given their 
hybrid status as government created but privately owned 
corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are known 
collectively as Government Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs.13   
Perhaps more important than the mortgage insurance offered 
by FHA, VA and the GSEs, these entities introduced and 
standardized many aspects of the mortgage industry that we now 
take for granted, such as the 30 year self-amortizing mortgage, 
the standardized appraisal process and the reduction of the 
downpayment required to 10% or lower.14 These advances, 
combined with significant economic growth in the post WWII 
                                                          
Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain and the Ethic of 
Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV 949, 956–57 (2008) (“[The] high rate 
of homeownership is largely a product of the federal government’s 
decision . . . to subsidize homeownership for the middle class.”). 
10 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 50; Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 
9, at 957–58. 
11 See David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the 
Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (2008). 
12 See id. at 1029 (“[Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s] purchasing 
practices have since converged.”). 
13 See Reiss, supra note 11, at n.22 (“The term GSE refers to a federally 
chartered, privately owned, privately managed financial institution that has 
only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bond market investors 
perceive as implicitly backed by the federal government.”) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted).  
14 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 5051; see also KENNETH JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
20318 (1987).  
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years, were extremely successful in increasing homeownership 
in this country. Between 1940 and 1970, the percentage of 
American homeowners increased from 44% to 65% of all 
households.15 Between 1970 and 1990 that rate stayed 
substantially the same, but then increased to over 67% by 2000 
and 69% at the end of 2004.16 With the foreclosure crisis 
beginning in 2006, the homeownership rate has been contracting 
from the previous highs and by the middle of 2009 was at 
67.4%.17 The reduction from 69% to 67.4% of all households 
may sounds small, but it represents over two million 
households.18 Notably, this represents the first significant decline 
in homeownership since the 1930’s.19  
B. Homeownership Subsidies 
In addition to the federal mortgage programs discussed 
above, which are aimed at increasing the availability of home 
financing, federal and state governments provide a number of 
other direct and indirect financial benefits to homeowners. Most 
significantly, homeowners are entitled to deduct from the income 
on which they have to pay income taxes both the amount they 
                                                          
15 Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 957 n.22. 
16 Gale et al., Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 
TAX NOTES 1171 (2007). 
17 See U.S. Census Bureau News, Census Bureau Reports on Residential 
Vacancies and homeownership, July 24, 2009, at 4, http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr209/filesq209press.pdf; see also Kathleen M. 
Howley, U.S. Home Vacancies Hit 18.7 Million on Bank Seizures, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, July 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
+20601206&sid=ajlP7ROLo39w (describing that the homeownership rate 
had dropped to 67.3%); John Leland, Homeownership Losses are Greatest 
Among Minorities, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13homeowner.html. 
18 See US Census Bureau Web Page, America’s Families and Living 
Arrangements: 2008: Table H1—Households by Type and Tenure of 
Householder for Selected Characteristics: 2008, Feb. 25, 2009, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2008.html 
(estimating total number of American households). 
19 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 14 fig. 2.2. 
CHASE REVISED.DOC 4/27/2010  7:32 PM 
 RETHINKING THE HOMEOWNERSHIP SOCIETY 67 
pay in real property taxes20 and interest paid on a mortgage 
secured by a personal residence.21 The mortgage interest 
deduction includes second homes in addition to primary 
residences, with an overall limit for each taxpayer of mortgages 
totaling up to $1 million.22 Other tax benefits include the fact 
that imputed rental income is not considered income for tax 
purposes and therefore is not taxed.23  Furthermore, in 1996 the 
tax code was amended at the initiation of the Clinton 
Administration so that homeowners selling their primary 
residence could exclude the first $250,000 of gain ($500,000 for 
married couples) from their reported income.24 Acknowledging 
all of these benefits to homeowners, two law professors 
conclude that “[h]omeowners are afforded both significant 
monetary benefits and social capital that renters are denied.”25   
Scholars have identified a number of problems with the 
mortgage interest deduction and other federal tax benefits 
provided to homeowners. First, the current subsidies accrue 
disproportionately to households in higher income brackets.26 
                                                          
20 26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2009). 
21 26 U.S.C. §§ 163(h), 164 (2000).  
22 See id.  
23 Imputed rent is a tax concept that refers to the amount of rental 
income that the housing unit would generate if it were rented out. Imputed 
rent is taxed in a number of countries, such as Italy, Norway, and Denmark. 
See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1058 n.42 (citing sources); see also James R. 
Follain & Lisa Sturman Melamed, The False Messiah of Tax Policy: What 
Elimination of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a Careful 
Look at What it Delivers, 9 J. HOUSING RES. 179 (1998) (discussing 
importance of nontaxation of imputed rent). 
24 26 U.S.C. § 121. This tax advantage can be claimed only once every 
two years, and certain limited conditions must be met regarding the 
ownership and use of the home. See Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, Tax 
Break May Have Helped Cause Housing Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008 
(describing how this tax advantage coincided, and may have helped cause the 
incredible run up in housing prices from 1997–2006). 
25 Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 953. 
26 See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 16, at 9 (describing the deduction as 
“upside down”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 72–76; Downs, Why, supra 
note 9, at 910. 
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Deductions increase in value as a household’s taxable income 
increases, so that higher-income taxpayers in the 28 percent 
marginal tax bracket save 28 cents for every dollar of mortgage 
interest deduction, and lower income taxpayers in the 15 percent 
marginal tax bracket saves 15 cents for every dollar of mortgage 
interest deduction. As a result, in 2005 wealthy households 
(earning more than $200,000 per year) took more than eight 
times as much mortgage interest deduction than middle class 
households (earning between $50-75,000).27 Also, more 
significantly, homeowners who do not itemize their taxes do not 
benefit at all from the mortgage interest and real property tax 
deductions. Because many choose to take the standard deduction, 
only half of all homeowners benefit from these crucial 
government subsidies.28 Furthermore, other borrowers (such as 
credit card borrowers) are not entitled to deduct interest 
expenditures at all.29  
The total annual cost to the federal government, in terms of 
tax expenditures and indirect subsidies of the GSEs, is in the 
$150 to $200 billion range annually. Even without the benefits 
provided through the GSEs and FHA and VA, which are 
difficult to quantify,30 the tax revenue lost annually to 
                                                          
27 See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 910. 
28 See Roger Lowenstein, Tax Break: Who Needs the Mortgage Interest 
Deduction, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006.  
29 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the deductibility of other 
kinds of interest payments, including credit cards, pushing more homeowners 
into increasing their mortgages. See Lowenstein, supra note 28. 
30 The actual subsidy to the GSEs prior to 2008 was difficult to quantify 
because most of the subsidy was the implicit federal guarantee of the GSEs’ 
obligations, which in turn allowed them to access capital at a cheaper cost. 
Compare Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1777 (noting that to the extent it can 
be quantified, the Congressional Budget Office estimated subsidy to GSEs at 
$23 billion in 2003) with Reiss, supra note 11, at 104849 (noting that a 
Federal Reserve researcher “has estimated that the present value of the 
federal government’s subsidy of Fannie and Freddie is nearly $150 
billion . . .”). In September 2008, the US Treasury Department announced 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were in danger of falling into insolvency 
and would be placed into conservatorship, governed by the newly created 
Federal Housing Finance Agency. See James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes 
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homeownership benefits was in excess of $155 billion for 
2006,31 over $125 billion for 2007 and approximately $230 
billion in 2009.32 It is far from clear how we as a society benefit 
from these subsidies. Many economists believe that the tax 
benefits simply push up the price of homes and do not increase 
the levels of homeownership.33 Professor Schwartz of the New 
School notes that homeownership rates in the United State are 
comparable to those in Canada, Australia and several European 
countries, despite the fact that none of those countries subsidize 
homeownership nearly as much as the U.S.34 Most notably, none 
of those countries provide for the deductibility of mortgage 
interest or property taxes. In addition to having a dubious impact 
on the rate of homeownership, the tax incentives encourage 
                                                          
Mortgage Giants, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. While the Treasury 
initially pledged $100 billion, it was quickly raised to $200 billion to cover 
the losses of Fannie and Freddie. As of the date of this article that amount 
has been increased to $400 billion [on source], with close to $85 billion 
already distributed. See Chris Isidore, Fannie & Freddie: The Most Expensive 
Bailout, CNNMONEY.COM, July 22, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/ 
22/news/companies/fannie_freddie_bilout/index/htm. 
31 See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1174. This includes 
approximately $30 billion in benefits accumulated from the non-taxation of 
imputed rent, as well as the deductibility of mortgage interest, property taxes 
and the exclusion from capital gains of sales proceeds.  
32 See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 958 (regarding 2007). It is 
unclear if this calculation includes the value of the non-taxation of imputed 
rent). In Housing Bust, Government Increasingly Favors Homeowners Over 
Renters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009 (compared with $60 billion in aid to 
renters for 2009). 
33 See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1180 (“[T]ime series evidence 
in the U.S. provides little reason to believe that the [mortgage interest 
deduction] has a substantial influence on homeownership.”); Steven Malanga, 
Obsessive Housing Disorder, CITY J., Spring 2009, at 10, available at 
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_2_homeownership.html (suggesting 
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction); Edward Glaeser & Joseph 
Gyourko, Two Ways to Revamp U.S Housing Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2008, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/two-ways-torevamp-us 
-housing-policy/. 
34 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 76; see also Gale et al., supra note 
16, at 118183.  
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homeowners to buy more expensive houses and borrow more 
(up to $1 million), thereby increasing their tax deductions. 
These incentives are perverse in two ways: (i) they encourage 
homeowners to over-leverage their properties; and (ii) they 
encourage bigger and generally speaking more energy 
consumptive housing.35  
The critiques of the mortgage interest deduction come from 
all sides of the political spectrum, including liberal housing 
scholars like William Apgar,36 more conservative housing 
economists from the American Enterprise Institute37 and the 
Manhattan Institute,38 economists from the Brookings Institute 
and MIT39 and an economic columnist from the New York 
Times.40 While the effect of eliminating the mortgage interest 
deduction is debated,41 along with what should replace it, these 
                                                          
35 See Andre F. Shashaty, Help Us Shape the Future of Affordable 
Housing Policy, AFFORDABLE HOUSING FINANCE, Mar. 2008, at 24 (quoting 
Brett Harvey). 
36 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 5–9. 
37 See EDWARD GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL 
HOUSING POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 
(AEI Press, 2008) (proposing that the mortgage interest deduction be 
substantially reduced to a cap of $300,000 in large portions of the country 
that restrict housing through local zoning and land use regulations). But see 
Letter from Charles McMillan, President, Nat’l Assoc. of Realtors, to 
President Obama (Feb. 26, 2009) (“The National Association of 
REALTORS® believe the [Mortgage Interest Deduction] is the single most 
important tax provision for our nation and our families.”) 
38 See Steven Malanga, Obsessive Housing Disorder, CITY J., Spring 
2009 at 10. 
39 See Gale et al., supra note 16. 
40 See Lowenstein, supra note 28.  
41 See Follain & Melamed, supra note 23, at 19596 (arguing that the 
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction might not produce the 
predicted effects of equalizing the tax treatment of higher and lower income 
households, since higher income households might be able to finance their 
home purchases through other means like cash purchases and noting that the 
nontaxation of imputed rent might be more important to address than the 
mortgage interest deduction). Cf. Gale et al., supra note 16, at 16–17 
(arguing that eliminating the mortgage interest deduction will increase 
investment in rental properties, but will also encourage owners to sink more 
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critiques have made it into reform proposals. For example, in 
2005 President Bush’s Bipartisan Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform proposed changing the mortgage interest deduction to a 
15 percent credit and making it available to all tax filers, 
regardless of itemization status.42 President Obama proposed a 
similar plan during his campaign.43 As with other plans to 
restrict or amend the mortgage interest deduction, neither 
proposal has gathered momentum in Congress. Still, other 
changes have been proposed. President Obama’s fiscal year 
2010–11 budget proposal advanced the idea of reducing the rate 
of mortgage and other deductions available to taxpayers in the 
highest tax brackets.44 This budget proposal did not pass 
however, as the National Association of Realtors and other real 
estate interest groups responded with their usual predictions of 
disaster if such a change were enacted.45 
II. WHY DO WE SPEND ALL THIS MONEY TO SUPPORT 
HOMEOWNERSHIP? 
In the midst of the great depression, President Franklin 
Roosevelt argued that, “special safeguards should be thrown 
around home ownership as a guarantee of social and economic 
stability.”46 But that begs the question. Assuming for a moment 
that the various homeownership subsidies outlined above actually 
                                                          
equity into their homes and thus may end up in increasing total investment in 
housing).  
42 See Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 45. 
43 See Nick Timiraos, Homeownership Push is Rethought, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 12, 2008 (“Senator Obama has proposed a 10% mortgage interest tax 
credit for homeowners who don’t itemize.”). 
44 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 29–30 (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Res
ponsibility2.pdf. 
45 See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, NAR Opposes Mortgage 
Interest Deduction Provision on Obama’s Budget Proposal, (Feb. 26, 2009), 
available at http://www.realtor.org/government_affairs/mortgage_interest_ 
deduction/mid_obama_budget_proposal. 
46 See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 985 n.168. 
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do increase the rate of homeownership, there still remains the 
question of why our society should spend all these resources to 
privilege homeownership over renting. The main reasons 
proffered for supporting homeownership are: (i) homeownership 
benefits individual households; and (ii) an increase in 
homeownership creates positive externalities, or positive 
spillover effects that are shared by the community surrounding 
the homeowner households. 
A. Homeownership Benefits Individuals 
We can further divide the first claim—that households benefit 
from homeownership—into two basic components. The first is 
that enabling households to purchase homes will benefit those 
households financially.47 The financial benefit is also 
multifaceted. First, by having to make mortgage payments and 
thereby gaining equity, homeownership “gives households a 
default mechanism for savings.”48 That increased equity, in turn, 
“permits the owner to leverage capital, which can help to buy 
investment properties, start a new business, send a child to 
college, or save for retirement.”49 In addition to promoting 
savings and enabling households increased access to capital, 
homeowners enjoy a measure of price protection against housing 
cost increases that enable them to better plan financially.50 Of 
course the price protections are not absolute: real estate taxes, 
insurance and homeowners association or 
cooperative/condominium dues may increase, as may borrowing 
costs of borrowers who have taken out adjustable rate or 
payment option mortgages.51 But, at least compared with renters 
                                                          
47 But see Nat’l Found. For Credit Counseling, supra note 4 (finding that 
“almost half of all American adults, more than 100 million people, no longer 
believe that homeownership is a realistic way to build wealth”). 
48 See Shelter or Burden? ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2009 (quoting Richard 
Green of the University of South Carolina). 
49 See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 954. 
50 See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1054–55 (discussing price protection and 
caveats). 
51 See id. at 1055. 
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who are subject to market based rent increases on annual 
intervals, most homeowners’ housing costs are more predictable. 
Scholars also attribute increased stability to 
homeownership.52 This is related to price stability, of course, but 
the notion is somewhat broader than just price. The argument is 
that homeowners enjoy a psychic benefit resulting from their 
property rights to exercise dominion over their homes, exclude 
outsiders, and to remain in perpetuity (subject, of course, to the 
rights of lenders and governments to foreclose for non-payment 
of mortgages or taxes).53 Furthermore, as Professors Godsil & 
                                                          
52 While most scholars identify increased stability as a positive effect, 
there is some debate. Compare Apgar 2004 at 41–42 (“[R]esidential stability 
not only appears to promote community involvement and development of 
beneficial social capital but also effects educational outcomes.”) with Ingrid 
Ellen & Brendan O’Flaherty How New York Housing Policies Are Different—
And Maybe Why, in THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW YORK CITY (Irwin 
Garfinkel and Marcia Meyers eds., Russell Sage Foundation (forthcoming 
2010), at 33 (“While stability may be good for neighbors and for children, 
subsidizing it can create deadweight losses. Mobility gets workers to where 
they are most productive.”); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Mediocrity of 
Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income Housing Projects, 16–17 & n.28 
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 360, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1217870 [hereinafter Ellickson, The Mediocrity] 
(discussing mixed results of lock in effect resulting from rent regulation and 
project based subsidies); Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 
n.100 (noting negative effect on the efficiency of labor markets resulting 
from housing stability; see also Sam Roberts, Slump Creates Lack of Mobility 
for Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009 (Census Bureau has found that 
fewer people are moving in the recessionary economy, creating fears that job-
related moves are getting suppressed and workers are not re-sorted to the jobs 
that best use their skills). See Generally Robert C. Ellickson, Legal 
Constraints on Households Moves: Should Footloose Americans Envy the 
Rooted French, 6 n.8 (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 300, 
2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1445603 [hereinafter Ellickson, 
Legal Constraints] (reviewing differences in moving patterns among countries 
and discussing normative questions of which is preferable). 
53 See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 954–56 (citing 
psychological benefits of homeownership); see also Gale et al., supra note 
16, at 1171 (“Owning one’s home is widely viewed as an integral part of the 
American Dream . . . Americans are taught from an early age to aspire to 
homeownership . . . .”); Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 56 (“Residential 
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Simunovich write, once a down payment has been made and a 
mortgage obtained, “the household tends to be less mobile 
because the transaction costs associated with moving have been 
increased. This reduced mobility . . . translates into both 
commitment to place and stability for family.”54 And, for 
children, “[i]n the educational arena, residential stability helps 
students avoid the disruption linked to the relocation from one 
school to another.”55 In sum, scholars find a number of positive 
effects for households who achieve residential stability.  
B. External Benefits of Homeownership 
The positive community benefits associated with increased 
homeownership are well summarized by Gale et al:  
[m]ost importantly, homeowners may be more likely to 
be active citizens working for long-term, communitywide 
benefits. Homeowners may also take better care of their 
houses than renters would. High rates of homeownership 
may reduce crime in the area, perhaps because the 
greater geographic stability of homeowners vs. renters 
means that someone committing a crime would be 
recognized. Any of these behaviors, if sufficiently 
prevalent, could plausibly raise property values in the 
community at large and hence provide a benefit to people 
other than the homeowner.56  
The general theory posits that the value of homes are so 
dependent on the health of their surrounding community that 
                                                          
stability also enables parents to develop deeper and more meaningful 
attachment to social support networks, and to access existing job and human 
service referral networks.”). 
54 Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 971–72. 
55 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 41 (citing Eric A. Hanushek et al., 
Disruption Versus Tiebout Improvement: The Costs and Benefits of Switching 
Schools, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1721–46 (2004)).  
56 See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 6; see also Fennell, supra note 8, at 
1098–99, n.209 & n.213; Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 970 (“A 
range of empirical studies have concluded that homeownership does in fact 
have salutary benefits for households and communities . . . .”). 
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homeowners have a strong self interest in improving and 
maintaining their neighborhoods.57 
C. The Reasons for Supporting Homeownership Argue 
Equally For Enhanced Rental Stability 
Many of the arguments supporting homeownership follow 
from the claim that homeownership is a more stable form of 
tenure than renting. But there is no reason to think that the 
positive effects for individual households and surrounding 
communities associated with the stability offered by 
homeownership are restricted to homeownership. As Apgar 
states, while “the social/psychological aspects of housing are 
discussed in terms of owner-occupied housing . . . there is 
nothing inherent in the concept of ‘home’ that is necessarily 
linked to homeownership.”58 And there is empirical support for 
                                                          
57 Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9 at 972 (“Once a homeowner has 
developed a financial stake in a particular dwelling, there is a close link 
between that financial stake and the well-being of the community in which the 
dwelling is located.”); see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS 9–12 (2001) (arguing that homeowners are so concerned about 
property values that they become risk averse to a fault, making homeowners 
into “NIMBYs” even when a proposed change carries a positive expected 
value). There is, however, substantial debate concerning whether increased 
homeownership is merely correlated with these benefits or whether it in fact 
causes such outcomes. See Fennell, supra note 8, at n.213 (“Selection bias 
presents a difficulty in interpreting empirical results, however—do people 
with good-neighbor characteristics just happen to become homeowners, or is 
there something about homeownership that improves their neighborliness.”). 
Gale et al., conclude that, “while there are some compelling arguments in 
theory for external benefits from homeownership, there is little evidence in 
practice to support those arguments. That does not prove that the arguments 
are wrong, but the burden should be on advocates of homeownership 
subsidies to make the case, and that case has not yet been made in a 
compelling fashion.” See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 7; see also Apgar 
2004, supra note 5, at 4 (“[P]olicy makers are often less than cautious in 
interpreting the existing literature [regarding benefits of homeownership].”). 
58 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 15; see also Ellen & O’Flaherty, 
supra note 52, at 33 (“To the extent that rent control and rent subsidies mean 
that tenants realize consumer surplus from their apartments in New York, 
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this assertion: a much cited study from two leading housing 
economists finds that much of the positive spillover effect 
associated with increased homeownership in fact results from 
longer term residences, and not homeownership per se.59 This 
finding is supported by a research report from the National 
Association of Realtors, one of the biggest proponents of 
homeownership subsidies.60  
The findings of this study make intuitive sense. Long-term 
tenants have the same interest as owners in living in clean and 
safe neighborhoods with good schools. Thus, long-term tenants 
are similarly likely to be engaged in civic affairs. While it is 
true that renters do not have the same profit motive as 
homeowners in creating desirable living conditions, it is 
                                                          
they have a stake in the outcome of local political decisions, and so are more 
likely to participate intelligently in the development of those policies. This 
argument is usually made for homeownership [citing sources], but if it is 
true, then rent control and rent subsidies provide the same sort of 
advantages.”); see also id at 31 (“Both rent control and subsidies to single-
family owners help to further population stability.”); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (“[T]enancy, 
no less than a single-family house, is the sort of property interest in which a 
person becomes self-invested; and after the self-investment has taken place, 
retention of the interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely 
fungible interests of others.”).  
59 Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social 
Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON., 354–84, 
(1999).  
60 See Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or 
Illusion of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 591 & n.91 (2009) 
[hereinafter Adams, Homeownership] (quoting from Research Div., Nat’l 
Ass’n of Realtors, Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing 
(2006)), http://www.realtor.org/research/research/homeownershipbenefits 
(click “Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing” hyperlink) 
(“[T]he purported benefits of homeownership may partly arise not directly 
from the ownership, but from greater housing stability and social ties 
associated with less frequent movements among homeowners. Therefore, 
policies to boost homeownership can raise positive social outcomes, but only 
to the extent that homeownership brings housing stability. Also, if it is in fact 
the case that housing stability matters more than homeownership in bringing 
social benefits, then the policy implication is not necessarily to promote 
homeownership but to assist in residential stability.”). 
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unreasonable to say the lack of such a motive would eliminate 
the desire to live in good conditions for one’s family.61 Indeed, 
one notable scholar, William Simon, argues that the increased 
stability achieved by rent control in fact encourages more robust 
long-term community involvement than homeownership because 
it forces the tenant to stay in place to share the benefits of 
community improvement, rather than enabling the resident to 
benefit from those improvements by selling their home at a 
premium.62 These studies suggest that a housing policy seeking 
to strengthen residential stability should encourage longer term 
stays in both owned homes and rentals.  This would mean 
focusing on increasing “sustainable” homeownership, as well as 
increasing rental stability. This is the focus of my paper. 
Now we turn briefly to measure our current level of 
residential stability. In sum, the foreclosure crisis has had a 
devastating impact on the stability of millions of American 
households, their neighborhoods, and state and local 
governments. The devastation wrought by this crisis belies the 
notion that home ownership always promotes social and 
economic stability.63  
                                                          
61 For the reasons identified above, I believe that Lawrence Summers, 
the head of the President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors is wrong to 
compare renting a home to renting a car. See Conor Dougherty, In the 
Exurbs, the American Dream Is Up for Rent, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, at 
A18. (attributing to Laurence Summers the following statement: “No one in 
the history of the world ever washed a rental car”). My rejoinder is that 
many people wash leased cars that they have for one year, which is more 
akin to rental housing than renting a car for a weekend. Renting a car for a 
weekend is better analogized to renting a hotel room for a weekend, which I 
would agree, rarely gets cleaned by its occupants.  
62 William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 
1335, 1360 (1991); see also Benjamin D. Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 290 n.147 (discussing the Simon article and 
economic and moral arguments involved in rent regulation). 
63 See Shelter or Burden?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2009 (“[P]erversely, 
the decade of obsession with homeownership may actually have reduced 
neighborhood stability.”). 
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III. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND RESULTING INSTABILITY 
A. Foreclosure Crisis: The Statistics 
It was distressing to learn recently that, despite some 
stabilization in home prices,64 the increase in foreclosures has 
not abated. 65 In fact, the first six months of 2009 were the worst 
on record. New foreclosure filings reached over 1.5 million for 
the first half of 2009 according to RealtyTrac, the highest since 
it began recording in 2005.66 A report issued by the Mortgage 
Bankers Association on August 20, 2009 found that the 
combined percentage of loans in foreclosure and those otherwise 
delinquent was over 13% of all mortgages outstanding (more 
than one in eight loans), “the highest ever recorded in the MBA 
delinquency survey,” which commenced in its current form in 
                                                          
64 See David Streitfeld, Housing Perks Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/business/economy/26econ. 
html?_r=1&sep+1&sq=housing%20perks%20up&st=cse (citing Case-
Schiller index report showing modest increases in housing prices in June 
2009 in 18 of the 20 major U.S. metropolitan areas). 
65 The detailed causes of the foreclosure crisis have been much discussed 
and debated. Neither of the thesis points in this paper, that our 
homeownership policies have not resulted in a stable housing situation and 
that a focus on rental housing is needed, are contingent on identifying the 
exact causes and culprits. However, I do believe the causes are complex and 
involve the following intertwined phenomenon: (i) the development of an 
overheated secondary market for funding mortgage loans, (ii) the creation of 
more exotic, complex and risky loan products that were designed for 
subprime borrowers but were soon pushed on all borrowers; (iii) an 
unparalleled run up in home prices; (iv) Americans taking out more and 
bigger mortgage loans and home equity loans throughout the late 1990s and 
early 2000; and finally (v) a severe economic recession and resulting job 
losses. See generally Adams, supra note 60, at 599–607 (discussing above 
mentioned causes of the foreclosure crisis); Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the 
Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the Community 
Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 618, 620–27 (providing statistics on 
the subprime mortgage crisis). 
66 See Les Christie, 1.5 million homes in foreclosure in ‘09, 
CNNMONEY.COM, July 16, 2009 http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/16/real_ 
estate/RealtyTrac_foreclosure_report/.  
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1972.67 Notably, the foreclosure problems are increasingly 
affecting prime borrowers who have lost their jobs, as opposed 
to the 2006–2008 foreclosures which primarily affected those 
with subprime and/or adjustable rate loans.68 Experts predict that 
in 2009, 2.4 million homes will be lost to foreclosure or short 
sales.69 Another 1.7 million homes were foreclosed in 2008.70 
Overall, between 2009–2012, Credit Suisse estimates that 
between 8 and 9 million homes will be foreclosed.71 And many 
of these homes, once foreclosed, are lying dormant. In July 
2009 the US Census Bureau estimated that more than 10% of all 
homes were vacant.72 
The foreclosure crisis demonstrates one of the downsides of 
the constant push for homeownership. By creating incentives for 
borrowers to incur more and more mortgage debt and shielding 
the profits from capital gains tax, federal housing policy 
                                                          
67  See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies 
Continue to Climb, Foreclosures Flat in Latest MBA National Delinquency 
Survey, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/ 
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/70050.htm. 
68 See Peter Goodman & Jack Healy, Job Losses Push Safer Mortgages 
to Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at A1; Nick Timiraos, Souring 
Prime Loans Compound Mortgage Woes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2009, at 
A4. “Subprime” mortgages are intended “for borrowers with significant 
credit history problems.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 234 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
69 Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime Spillover: Accelerating 
Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billon in 2009 Alone, May 7, 2009, 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/ 
soaring-spillover-accelerating-foreclosures-to-cost-neighbors-436-billion-in-
2009-alone-73–4-million-homes-lose-5-900-on-average.html. 
70 Simon, Banks Ramp Up Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2009, at 
A1 (citing estimates available at http://www.economy.com). 
71 Rod Dubitsky et al., Foreclosure Update: Over 8 Million Foreclosures 
Expected, CREDIT SUISSE, Dec. 4, 2008, at 1.  
72 See U.S. Census Bureau News, supra note 17, at 1; see also Haya El 
Nasser, Open House, Anyone? 1 in 9 Homes Sit Empty, USA TODAY, Apr. 
10, 2009; cf. John Leland, With Advocates Help,  More Squatters Are Calling 
Foreclosures Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, at A1 (describing growing 
phenomenon in Philadelphia, Minnesota, Miami, where organized grassroots 
efforts are placing homeless persons in foreclosed or abandoned homes).  
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distorted the housing market and contributed to the real estate 
bubble and subsequent crash. The millions of foreclosures have 
had a devastating effect on the affected households, their 
surrounding neighborhoods, and local governments.73 These 
effects are reviewed below, beginning with individual 
households. 
B. Resulting Instability 
1. Foreclosure Effects on Individuals 
At its core, foreclosure leaves a family without a place to 
live and increases the risk of homelessness. On a financial level, 
foreclosure results in the loss of the largest financial asset most 
households will ever own.74 This greatly compromises the 
household’s ability to borrow for important investments like 
higher education, retirement, or to provide for future 
generations.75 The lowered credit score resulting from 
                                                          
73 Tad Friend, Cash for Keys, NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 2009 (describing 
the dramatic dislocation effects of foreclosure on individual households and 
the potential for social upheaval as a result of foreclosure crisis); see, e.g., 
Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public 
Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 726–27 (2008) (describing the 
devastating impact to individual households and neighborhoods, especially 
where foreclosures are concentrated). See generally Florence Wagman 
Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of 
Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C.L. REV. 817 
(2008) (describing the impact of eviction on families and society at large).  
74 NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. SERVICES OF CHICAGO, PRESERVING 
HOMEOWNERSHIP: COMMUNITY-DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW 
MORTGAGE MARKET 21 (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.nw.org/ 
network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolutionsOLD/documents/preserving
HomeownershipRpt.pdf. 
75 Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of 
Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 607 & n.274 (Spring 2009) (“At 
the point where a consumer’s liabilities eclipse his or her assets, the 
indicators of upward class mobility—economic equilibrium and stability, the 
ability to enhance human capital in order to specialize, the wherewithal to 
take risks and have a positive vision of the future, as well as the capacity to 
offer future generations greater opportunities—correspondingly 
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foreclosure makes future homeownership more difficult, may 
decrease job prospects, and limits the ability to obtain insurance 
or rental housing.76 The changes in school, friends and social 
networks are disruptive to children’s development.77 The 
accumulation of these decreased opportunities as a result of the 
loss of one’s home affect an individual’s positive vision of the 
future and ability to rebound—ultimately resulting in the loss of 
middle class status.78 
2. Foreclosure Effects on Neighborhoods 
At a community level, foreclosures lead to blight and 
disinvestment.79  Most immediately, foreclosures of multifamily 
                                                          
disappear . . . . Moreover, the loss of a home is the loss of an asset that 
could have been handed down to the next generation.”).  
76 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: 
The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57, 58 (2006); see also, NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. 
SERVICES OF CHICAGO, supra note 74, at 13–20. 
77 See Christine Vidmar, Seven Ways Foreclosures Impact Communities, 
NeighborWorks America, Aug. 2008, available at http://neighborworks. 
issuelab.org/research/listing/seven_ways_foreclosures_impact_communities; 
see also Phillip Lovell & Julia Issacs, The Impact of the Mortgage Crisis on 
Children, FIRST FOCUS, May 2008, at 1, available at http://www.firstfocus. 
net/Download/HousingandChildrenFINAL.pdf. 
78 Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 CARDOZO STUD. LAW & 
LITERATURE 291, 295 (“The social meaning of home loss is the loss of a 
family’s economic stability, and with that the loss of middle-class status.”); 
see also Robert Schiller, The Scars of Losing a Home, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2008, at 5 (“[I]t is important to consider the psychological trauma of 
foreclosure [since homeownership is a] fundamental part of a sense of 
belonging to a country.”); Brad Heath & Charisse Jones, In Denver, 
Foreclosures and a Dramatic Exodus, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1 
(“For hundreds of homeowners in this mostly middle-class corner of 
Denver—and an estimated 1.2 million more nationwide—the wave of 
foreclosures battering U.S. financial markets is quickly unraveling the 
American dream. Those who have lost homes here describe seeing their lives 
crumble into anxiety and embarrassment.”). 
79 See Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending 
Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 686 (2008) 
(“Rising foreclosures have started to blight certain areas of American cities 
CHASE REVISED.DOC 4/27/2010  7:32 PM 
82 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
buildings usually result in the displacement of tenants. Secretary 
Shaun Donovan of the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban 
Development (HUD) recently stated that 40% of those displaced 
to date from the foreclosure crisis have been renters.80 The 
federal government has tried to address the effect of foreclosures 
on tenants. Congress passed a new law in May 2009 that 
protects tenants from immediate eviction by persons or entities 
that become owners of property through foreclosure. Under the 
law, the immediate successor in interest at foreclosure must: 
(a) provide bona fide tenants with 90 days notice prior to 
eviction; and, (b) allow bona fide tenants with leases to occupy 
property until the end of the lease term, except the lease can be 
terminated on 90 days notice if the unit is sold to a purchaser 
who will occupy the property.81 In New Jersey and New 
Hampshire, with statutes that restrict a landlord’s right to evict 
for good cause, bona fide renters are protected when their 
buildings are foreclosed.82 Despite these efforts to limit the 
effects of foreclosure, communities surrounding foreclosed 
homes have suffered greatly in the current crisis. 
Increasingly, foreclosures result in vacancies, which in turn 
lead to an array of public health concerns. These concerns 
include arson, which in turn exposes lead paint, trash 
accumulation, illegal dumping, and rodent infestations.83 In 
                                                          
hit hardest by the problem.”). 
80 Erika Morphy, HUD Plays Key Role in Financial System Revamp, 
GLOBE ST., June 18, 2009, available at http://www.globest.com/news/ 
1435_1435/washington/179338; see also, Abby Goodnough, Hard Times 
Hitting New England Three Deckers, New England’s City Backdrop, 
N.Y.TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A1 (chronicling how multifamily buildings in 
New England’s cities are being foreclosed on as a higher rate than homes 
overall); Vicki Been & Allegra Glasshauser, The Worst of Times: 
Perspectives on and Solutions for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV 1, 2–3 (2009) (chronicling how foreclosure crisis is 
“significantly impacting renters throughout the country” because most states 
allow the purchaser at a foreclosure sale to evict the existing tenants).  
81 See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111–22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009). 
82 See Been & Glasshauser, supra note 80, at 16. 
83 John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair 
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addition, foreclosures result in higher crime rates for the 
surrounding community.84 This type of blight decreases property 
values of neighboring homeowners and thus dissuades further 
investment.85 Community destabilization and disinvestment are 
especially pronounced where foreclosures are geographically 
concentrated.86 
3. Foreclosure Effects on  
Local Governments  
Finally, foreclosures have a detrimental impact on the fiscal 
stability of states and localities in which they occur. For 
example, one study found that foreclosures in Chicago involve 
                                                          
Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629, 650 (2008) (“Foreclosures mean 
abandoned homes; increased risks of fire, crime, and drugs; increases in 
homelessness and job loss; deterioration of schools; and a crippling shortage 
of city funds for existing social programs.”) 
84 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 863 
(2006) (“These findings suggest that foreclosures may have important social 
and economic consequences on neighborhoods beyond effects on the finances 
of households directly affected by the foreclosure. An increase in violent 
crime is an important social cost, as well as an economic cost, that must be 
incorporated into policy making concerning real estate and mortgage lending 
policies and regulation.”); see also, Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, 
Minorities Affected Most as New York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 2009 (citing Immergluck & Smith). 
85 See Immergluck & Smith, supra note 84, at 58; Soaring Spillover: 
Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billon in 2009 Alone, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, May 7, 2009, http://www.responsible 
lending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-spillover-accelerating-
foreclosures-to-cost-neighbors-436-billion-in-2009-alone-73-4-million-homes-
lose-5-900-on-average.html; see also Vidmar, supra note 77; Elsa Brenner, 
Freeing Towns to Tackle Blight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at RE9 
(describing effect of foreclosures on local property values in affluent 
neighborhoods of Mount Vernon, NY). 
86 See Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated 
Mortgage Foreclosures (NYU Center for Law and Economics, Working 
Paper No. 08–41 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270121; Cox, 
supra note 79, at 693.  
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more than a dozen city agencies and generate costs that in some 
cases exceeded $30,000 per property.87 Other effects include 
declining property tax revenues resulting from declining 
property values described above.88 Thus the foreclosures create a 
downward spiral effect: just at the time that local governments 
are called on to deal with the effects of the foreclosure crisis, 
that very crisis has resulted in less tax revenue with which to 
help.  
In sum, the detrimental effects of the housing bubble and 
crash have extended far beyond the foreclosed homeowners. One 
category of victims of the foreclosure crisis, renters, have been 
suffering from decades of government neglect. 
IV. THE CRISIS IN RENTAL HOUSING  
The damage wrought by millions of foreclosures has, among 
other things, exposed the chronic crisis in the rental housing 
market. There are two fundamental defects in the rental housing 
market: (i) there is a desperate lack of rental housing affordable 
to low- and moderate- income households; and (ii) there is a 
need for increasing the options through which renters can obtain 
economic and psychological stability in their housing. Each will 
be explored in turn. 
A. Need for More Affordable Rental Housing 
As noted in the introductory section, almost one third of all 
Americans (36 million households) are renters.89 Furthermore, 
                                                          
87 WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, WASH. DC: HOMEOWNERSHIP 
PRESERVATION FOUND., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF 
TODAY’S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 4 (2005), http://www.995hope. 
org/content/pdf/Apgar_Duda_Study_Short_Version.pdf. 
88 Alan Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Governments 
Posed by the Housing and Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 259, 266 
(2008) (describing challenges including revenue shortfalls and rising costs); 
see also Vidmar, supra note 77 at 2–3. 
89 See Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of Neighborhood 
Homeownership Rates: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 
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the number of households needing rental housing is expanding. 
A recent report found that: “the number of renter households 
jumped by 2.8 percent or nearly one million in 2007.”90 And 
that trend had already begun before the worst of the foreclosure 
wave hit—the foreclosure crisis has added many families to the 
list of those who are in need of rental housing.91 All renters must 
deal with the fact that the supply of rental units has not been 
keeping up with demand.92 One study found that “84% of all the 
new housing units built from 1990 to 2006 were single family 
units . . . although an average of 34% of all households were 
renters during that entire period.”93 A vast majority of these 
single family units built were for sale and not offered as 
rentals.94  
The failure of the rental supply to meet the growing demand 
has exacerbated the affordability gap that has long plagued many 
rental households. Indeed, by the end of 2007 almost half of all 
rental households in the United States were rent burdened95 
(spending more than 30% of their gross income on housing 
                                                          
J. HOUSING RESEARCH 119–51 (2003); see also Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 
3; see also Katz & Turner, supra note 5, at 2. 
90 See HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, AMERICA’S 
RENTAL HOUSING-THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 2 (2008) 
[hereinafter HARVARD UNIV. CTR. FOR JOINT HOUSING STUDIES, BALANCED 
POLICY], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_ 
americas_rental_housing/rh08_americas_rental_housing_bw.pdf; see also id. 
at 8 (“Today’s mortgage makers woes will not only force many owners into 
the rental market but also limit the homebuyers opportunities for other lower-
income renters.”); id. at 9 (“If foreclosures continue to rise, renter household 
growth could return to levels not seen in a decade.”). 
91 See id. at 8. 
92 See, e.g., Benson, supra note 2, at 2 (“For years, growth in the 
number of renters at all income levels has far outpaced the construction of 
new rental units.”). 
93 See Downs Why, supra note 9, at 7. 
94 See id.  
95 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 23. (“The most common standard of 
housing affordability in the [U.S.] is 30% of income. Households spending 
30% or more of their pre-tax income on housing are viewed as having a 
excessive housing cost burden.”). 
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costs) and 24% of all rental households were severely rent 
burdened96 (spending more than 50% of their gross income on 
housing costs).97 These numbers represented significant increases 
from just seven years prior, in 2001.98 Looking at such numbers, 
as well as the increased number of rental units needed to house 
foreclosed households, Arthur Nelson, director of the University 
of Utah’s Metropolitan Research Center, recently concluded that 
half of all the units built in the coming years need to be 
rentals.99 Whether or not that figure is precise, the larger point is 
that the United States needs significant investment in rental 
housing in order to correct the market imbalances and bring 
rents more in line with families’ incomes.  
Notably, two corollaries of the current housing crisis—the 
glut of vacant homes and increased number of homes converted 
from for sale to rental status—seem to be reducing market rents 
charged.100 In Phoenix investors are reportedly purchasing 
                                                          
96 See id. (“Housing cost burdens are defined as severe when housing 
expenses amount to 50% or more of income.”). 
97 HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 2009 3 tbl.A–5 (2009), available at http://www.jchs. 
harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2009/son2009.pdf [hereinafter JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, State of the Nation]; see Katz & Turner, supra 
note 5, at 38 (“[G]ross rents . . . have grown faster than inflation while 
median renter’s monthly income has declined 7.3 percent since 2000.”); 
NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 4 (2009) available at 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009/oor2009pub.pdf (calculating the current 
“housing wage,” or the amount it takes to afford a modest two-bedroom 
apartment at 30 percent of income, with the 2009 the national average 
housing wage is $17.84 per hour, which was more than $3 in excess of the 
average national hourly wage and more than $10 in excess of the national 
minimum wage).  
98 See HARVARD UNIV. CTR. FOR JOINT HOUSING STUDIES, STATE OF 
THE NATION, supra note 97, at 38 tbl.A–5 (11.2% increase in households 
rent burdened and 19.2% increase in those severely rent burdened). 
99 See El Nasser, supra note 72 (noting that edges of metropolitan areas 
will turn into “exurban ghettos” as many units are turned over to renters). 
100 See Nick Timiraos, Apartment Glut Expands, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 
2009 (citing a report showing 7.9% vacancy rate for apartments and a 2.7% 
decrease in effective rental prices nationally); Shahien Nasiripour, Unable to 
Sell Their Houses, Millions of Homeowners are Turning Into Landlords, 
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foreclosed homes from banks at drastically reduced prices and 
then renting them to the same households that have been 
foreclosed.101 Along with others,102 Dean Baker of the Center for 
Economic Policy Research has proposed that mortgage servicers 
be forced to rent to delinquent homeowners at market rental 
prices as a part of a negotiated foreclosure.103 Reportedly, 
officials from the Obama Administration are considering Baker’s 
proposal.104 While future substantial drops in rental prices may 
occur, the real estate crisis thus far has resulted in only a 
relatively small reduction in rental prices.105 There is no 
evidence that the housing market has in any long lasting way 
addressed the affordability crisis that has built up since the 
1980s.106 
                                                          
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/ 
14/unable-to-sell-their-hous_n_283655.html (describing 2.5 million units 
being converted from for sale to rentals since 2007, although many may be 
rentals only until the for sale market picks up). 
101 See David Streitfeld, Amid Housing Bust, Phoenix Begins a New 
Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at A1. 
102 See, e.g., David Kappell, A Rental Model Could Solve The Housing 
Crisis, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 2009, available at http://www.newsday.com/ 
opinion/a-rental-model-could-solve-the-housing-crisis-1.1219384. The author, 
a former mayor on Long Island, notes the fact that millions of homes lie 
dormant waiting for buyers while millions of households need housing as a 
result of foreclosure, proposing that mortgage servicers agree to rent homes 
in foreclosure to the current occupants. 
103 See DEAN BAKER, THE RIGHT TO RENT PLAN (Ctr. for Econ. Policy 
Research 2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ 
right-to-rent-2009-07.pdf. 
104 See Patrick Rucker, Obama Mulls Rental Option for Homeowners, 
REUTERS, July 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/euRegulatoryNews/ 
idUSN1429055220090714. 
105 See Timiraos, supra note 100 (citing a 2.7% decrease in effective 
rental prices nationally); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, State of the Nation, 
supra note 97 at 21 (real rents fell by 0.2 percent nationally in 2008). 
106 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, Balanced Policy, supra note 90, 
at 3 (“With these large, unprecedented shifts on both the demand and supply 
sides of the rental market, the direction of rents is impossible to predict.”); 
see also Joint Center for Housing Studies, Fact Sheet-America’s Rental 
Housing-The Key to a Balanced National Policy, Apr. 30, 2008 (noting new 
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As detailed below, changes to U.S. government housing 
policy107 over the past thirty years have resulted in fewer rental 
units being built and maintained that are affordable to low and 
moderate income households. The first of these changes has 
been the dramatic decrease in federal funding appropriated 
through HUD for rental subsidies.108 (As discussed in Section 
I.B, this has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in federal 
subsidies going to homeowners). Specifically, HUD has funded 
virtually no new public housing units since 1980 and drastically 
cut back on the number of projects receiving building wide 
Section 8 assistance.109 Not only has new production of HUD-
assisted units diminished, but also hundreds of thousands of 
previously HUD-assisted units have been removed by their 
owners from the applicable governmental programs and brought 
to market rate.110 In addition, changes to the Income Tax Law in 
                                                          
wave of foreclosed homes being rented but stating that “most renters do not 
have adequate income to take advantage of these opportunities”); National 
Low Income Housing Coalition, New Census Housing Data Confirm Number 
of Renters Facing Housing Problems on the Rise, Sept. 23, 2009 (analyzing 
national census data and finding that, from 2006 to 2008, median gross rents 
increased from $763 to $824 and that the number of rent burdened 
households increased by 600,000). 
107 While I focus here on national housing policy, local governments have 
also played a role in restricting the number of rental units. Many of the 
suburban and exurban communities which have grown so quickly over the 
past thirty years have increasingly restricted zoning to exclude larger 
multifamily buildings, or even rentals at all. This drives up the price of land 
in communities which do allow for rentals and thereby decreases the supply 
and affordability of housing that can be built. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, 
at 37. 
108 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 40–42. 
109 See id. at 42.  Project based Section 8 was a HUD administered 
program during the 1980’s which gave owners rent subsidies for all qualified 
units.   
110 See id. at 36; see also Benson, supra note 2, at 2 (“Beyond cutting 
back the level of spending on public housing operations and maintenance, the 
Bush administration set policies at HUD that effectively reduced the number 
of rental vouchers in use. Meanwhile, demolitions under HOPE VI, signed 
into law by President George Bush in 1992, have driven a net loss of about 
165,000 public housing units since 1995.”). 
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1986 eliminated most of the accelerated depreciation benefits 
that had until then been provided to investors in all rental 
housing projects, with even more generous benefits for investors 
of low income rental housing.111 While the introduction of the 
low income housing tax credit (LIHTC)112 has had some success 
in replacing accelerated depreciation as an incentive for equity 
investment in low income rental projects, LIHTC funded 
projects have not been able to stem the overall loss of affordable 
units.113 Overall, the federal government spends roughly $30 
billion annually to support rental housing for low to moderate 
income households.114 This is less than one fourth of what it 
spends for homeownership programs.115 This disparity, together 
                                                          
111 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 63, 78–81. In addition to the 
challenge to the equity side of the financing model presented by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, debt financing for multifamily rental housing was 
severely curtailed by the failure of so many thrifts on the 1980’s which had 
been the primary lenders for such rental projects. See id. at 62. The 
legislative response to the failure of thrifts (the S+L Crisis) exacerbated this 
development, creating significantly more restrictions on lending to 
multifamily buildings as compared with single family properties. See id. at 
62–63. 
112 See I.R.C. § 42 (LEXIS 1986).  
113 See SCHWARTZ supra note 9, at 81. 
114 See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1172–73 (citing $30 billion number 
for 2005, which includes grant funds administered through HUD and the 
Department of Agriculture for farmer/rural housing as well as various tax 
benefits administered by the Treasury Department which support the 
investment in low income rental housing, note that some of the funding in 
this category goes to support homeownership programs as well so getting the 
exact amount spent on rental programs is difficult); see also SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 9, at 69 (citing $30 billion in “direct” housing subsidies, as 
opposed to tax expenditures, some small percentage of this includes 
homeownership subsidies); Downs, Why, supra note 9, at 7 (reporting that 
the total federal outlays on rental housing were approximately $32.3 billion 
for 2005. The highest percentage of this category of federal spending is 
forgone tax revenue supporting the LIHTC program, as well as federal 
outlays made to fund Section 8 vouchers). Section 8 vouchers provide a 
direct rental subsidy to households, enabling them to spend no more than 
30% of their gross income on rent. Id. 
115 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 12. (“For example, in fiscal year 
2001, program outlays for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
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with federal funding decisions begun after World War II which 
have prioritized highways over mass transit and similar anti-
urban and anti-density measures, have distorted the market for 
rental housing by favoring construction and ownership of single 
family suburban and exurban homes.116   
Beyond the need for more rental units generally, and 
affordable units in particular, there is a further need for more 
stable rental options for a growing number of households. 
B. Need for Rental Stability  
A report completed before the foreclosure crisis found that 
the number of stable renters was already significant: “More than 
a quarter of renter households surveyed in 2005 reported they 
had lived in their units for five or more years.”117 With more 
opportunities for stable tenure and some rent protection as 
proposed below, that number would undoubtedly be significantly 
higher. The category of households seeking stable tenancies 
includes, at a minimum, low- to moderate-income families who 
are looking to put down roots in a community, senior citizens 
                                                          
Development totaled $33.6 billion. In contrast, that same fiscal year federal 
tax expenditures for housing totaled $121.2 billion with tax related 
expenditures for homeowners (including mortgage interest and property tax 
deductions, and capital gains exclusion) accounting for $106 billion of that 
total.”); see also Section II.B and sources cited therein. 
116 See Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American Dream: Renting, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 15, 2009 (“Federal housing policies changed the whole 
landscape of America, creating the sprawlscapes that we now call home and 
in the process, gutting inner cities . . . .”). See generally  JACKSON, supra 
note 14.  
117 HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSing. STUDIES, THE STATE OF 
THE NATION’S HOUSING 2008, supra note 52, at 23. Cf. Ellickson, The 
Mediocrity, supra note 52, at 15 (stating that each year “about one-third of 
U.S. tenant households move to new quarters” according to a 2003 study 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce); Ellickson, Legal Constraints, 
supra note 52, at 6 n. 8 (citing an annual moving rate in the United States of 
32.5% for renters and 9.1% for owners, compared with annual moving rates 
of 17% for French renters and 4% for French homeowners). 
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and the disabled.118 In addition, the millions of foreclosures will 
dramatically increase the number of tenants who need augmented 
rental stability.119 To the extent that some of these households 
can create sustainable homeownership solutions, such a result 
would be a good outcome for those households. But there is 
undoubtedly some significant percentage of the American 
population for which homeownership does not make sense.120 
Under our free market based economic and property systems, 
many households do not have the financial means and/or the 
desire to be homeowners, with the full set of responsibilities that 
homeownership entails.121  
                                                          
118 See Courtney Gross, Affordable Housing Not Included, Gotham 
Gazette, Oct. 5, 2009 (describing disabled woman whose rent in the 
gentrified neighborhood of Williamsburg, Brooklyn was recently raised from 
$550 to $2100 when her building was purchased by a new owner).  
119 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
120 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 5 (“Public policy should focus on 
the larger goals of promoting access to decent and affordable housing, along 
with expanding social and economic opportunity for all, and in doing so 
recognize that promoting homeownership is just one of many possible means 
for achieving these end goals.”). But see Dalton Connolly, Op Ed., Safe at 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009 (arguing in favor of increased programs to 
promote and protect homeownership options for low-income households). 
121 See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 969–70 for a discussion of 
the rights and responsibilities of homeowners and renters (“[He or she] who 
owns a fee simple possesses the largest possible share of the rights in the 
iconic property bundle (use, possession, the right to exclude, and the right to 
transfer), while a person or family who possesses a leasehold interest has 
occupancy rights to the property only for a specified period of time . . . . 
[T]he fee owner of a rental property is also subject to legally imposed 
obligations to the leaseholder, like ensuring that the property is habitable.”); 
see also Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]enant/landlord laws and 
regulations govern the obligation of the property owner to meet certain 
standards of service provision and process concerning rent setting and 
eviction, as well as responsibilities of the tenant (including making rent 
payments in a timely manner). At the same time, tenants retain the option to 
vacate the property on relatively short notice . . . . Home owners generally 
have a more expansive set of rights, but also more responsibilities. Local 
zoning, building and health codes along with other land use regulations 
impose responsibilities on owners . . . or otherwise place limitations on the 
use of an owner occupied property.”).  
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As demonstrated above, the demand for moderately priced 
rental units exceeds supply in many parts of the United States. 
This gives landlords enormous leverage over low to moderate-
income rental households, and puts such tenants at a severe 
disadvantage when trying to bargain for long-term rental 
security. Thus many tenants are vulnerable to eviction on thirty 
days notice at the end of their leases.122  Indeed, a study 
completed in 1999 found that more than 97% of all private 
market residential leases (outside jurisdictions with rent 
regulation123) are for 1 year or less.124   
Given the failure of the market to provide sufficient 
affordable and stable rental units, it is understandable that many 
families overstretched their budgets in the past 15 years to 
purchase a home.125 One recent study demonstrated the 
relationship between the lack of affordable and stable rental 
options and the demand for homeownership by proving that 
households use homeownership to insure or “hedge” against 
predicted increases in future rent payments.126 The authors 
                                                          
122 See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden 
Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 463 (“[F]ew lower-
income tenants have leases, and if there is no lease . . . a landlord can evict 
without stating a reason, with only 30 days’ notice.”); Apgar 2004, supra 
note 5, at 56 (“[M]any families with children presumably would also value a 
chance to remain in their rental apartment for some time, but lacking a steady 
and secure source of income struggle to do so.”). 
123 In this paper I use the term “rent regulation” to refer generally to 
local and state laws which restrict the ability of landlords to raise rents. Thus 
rent regulation includes rent control, rent stabilization, rent restrictions and 
the like. 
124 See David Genesove, The Nominal Rigidity of Apartment Rents 16, 
tbl.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7137, 1999), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7137 (using data obtained from the 
Property Owners and Managers Survey).  
125 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 5 (“[M]any low-wealth and low-
income families are being ‘pushed’ into homeownership, not necessarily 
because they fully appreciate the implications of their choices, but because 
they perceive (or rather hope) that homeownership in and of itself will help 
them achieve a better life.”). 
126 Todd Sinai & Nichola S. Souleles, Owner-Occupied Housing as a 
Hedge Against Rent Risk, 120 Q. J. ECON., 763 (2005); see also Fennell, 
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summarized their findings by saying that “the rent-hedging 
benefit substantially increases the demand for owner occupied 
housing, for the population as a whole and especially for the 
elderly.”127 This study, together with the inadequacy of the rental 
options available to households at the lower end of the socio-
economic scale, suggest that improving the availability of 
affordable and stable rental options would reduce the demand for 
homeownership among such households. While such reduced 
demand is inconsistent with housing policy of the past 20 years, 
it is exactly the right response to the current foreclosure crisis.128 
V. RENTAL STABILITY PROGRAM PROPOSED 
Now is the time for policy makers to implement new 
protections for rental households. The growing crisis for 
families seeking affordable and stable rental options makes this a 
crucial imperative. The harder question to answer is what kind 
of rental protections are needed and what effect such protections 
will have on the overall market for rental housing. In drafting 
my proposal, my fundamental goal is to create increased 
opportunities for renters to obtain some meaningful measure of 
security in their tenure. Achieving stability of an infinite 
duration, as promised by homeownership129 (the present 
                                                          
supra note 8, at 1054–55 (“A much-cited advantage of owning a home is the 
element of price protection it provides. In housing markets without rent 
control, tenants face significant uncertainty about how much their current 
housing will cost in future periods.”).  
127 Sinai & Souleles, supra note 126. 
128 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 2009 at 25 (advocating for “new 
recognition of the risks that homeownership brings” and suggesting that now 
is a good time “to rethink federal affordable housing policy, which has until 
recently strongly favored homeownership programs”). Cf. Joseph Williams, 
President Shifts Focus to Renting, Not Owning, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 
2009 (quoting Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank as stating that “the 
American dream should be a home—not homeownership”). 
129 See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1056 (“In contrast [to renters], all 
homeowners possess something very valuable—the option to remain in their 
current homes for as long as they wish, provided they make the necessary 
mortgage and tax payments.”). 
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foreclosure crisis notwithstanding) is not my goal. Rather, 
tenants should have the option to enter into leases for a 
minimum of 5 years, and have rights to renew leases at 
reasonable rental increases for some certain amount of time, I 
propose ten years, absent certain changed or exigent 
circumstances on the landlord’s side.130 
A. Rental Stability Program Detailed 
The Rental Stability Program (hereinafter “the RSP”) I 
propose for states and localities to consider131 has a basic 
structure akin to the rent stabilization regime currently in effect 
in New York City,132 with some important differences that seek 
to accomplish my goals of increasing rental stability without 
undermining the basic market incentives for landlords. Under 
the RSP, landlords of buildings with more than 5 rental units 
would be required to register their rental units with an 
administrative body at an initial rent set only by the market. 
Landlords would be required to offer tenants the option to lease 
for terms of at least 1, 2 or 5 years.133 No matter which term of 
                                                          
130 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 56 (“To help families maintain 
longer term occupancy, and make better use of available support services, it 
would be useful to create model landlord tenant laws that include clearly 
articulated and easily enforceable residential leases designed to promote 
longer-term, more stable occupancy.”).  
131  As detailed infra in Section V, my proposal would require enabling 
legislation at the state level, and then be subject to adoption (or not) by 
municipal governments. Since RSP is designed to be appropriate in a number 
of urban housing markets, some of its parameters are subject to change as 
dictated by choices by state and local governments. 
132 For an introduction to New York City’s rent stabilization regimes, see 
TIMOTHY COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY RENT 
GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM (New York City 
Rent Guidelines Bd. ed., 2006) (2001), available at http://www.housingnyc. 
com/html/about/intro/toc.html. 
133 With this requirement, I seek to adapt a small portion of the European 
model of residential leases to the American context. France requires a 
minimum lease term of 3 years for apartments owned by individuals, and 6 
years for units owned by corporations, after which time the owner may 
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lease is chosen by the tenant, each year rent increases134 would 
be allowed up to the maximum permitted by a rent guidelines 
board (hereinafter “RGB”), as is currently in place in New York 
City.135 The RGB would consider all of the landlords’ legitimate 
costs in operating buildings (taxes and other fees, maintenance, 
utilities, labor, cost of capital) and calculate reasonable increases 
for the coming year.136 Additional increases would be allowed 
based on needed repairs completed to the individual unit or the 
building. In addition to the rent increases to cover the landlords’ 
costs, the landlord would be permitted market-based increases at 
the earliest of the following points in time: (i) ten years after the 
initial lease date of that tenant; (ii) the commencement of the 
fourth consecutive lease renewal by the same tenant; and 
(iii) vacancy of the unit. At the end of the term of the lease, 
absent certain good cause factors, the landlord would be 
required to offer tenants a renewal lease with the same term 
options (1, 2 or 5 years). New tenants would have the exact 
same deal, that is, the initial rent would be set at market and the 
                                                          
terminate the lease or get market rent increases. See Jane Ball, Renting 
Homes: Status and Security in the UK and France: A Comparison In the 
Light Of the Law Commission’s Proposals, 67 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 50 
(2003); see also Andrea Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring 
Good Cause for Tenant Eviction: Dangerous Portents for the United States, 
38 SETON HALL L. REV. 427, 440, 446 n.139 (2008) (discussing the reasons 
a French landlord can terminate a lease and describing a 1978 Landlord 
Tenant law which dictates that Italian leases cannot be less than 4 years). 
134 The rationale for annual rent increases is based largely on my 
interview with Marvin Markus, who explained that projecting costs more than 
one year in advance in purely speculative. It was this rationale, Markus 
stated, that led to a change in 1983 which limited the choice of New York 
City Rent Stabilized tenants to one or two years; prior to the enactment of the 
Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, tenants were given the additional option of 
choosing three year leases. Interview with Marvin Markus, Chairman, Rent 
Guidelines Bd. held at Markus’ offices at Goldman Sachs on June 1, 2009; 
see COLLINS, supra note 132, at 35 (stating legal change but not asserting 
rationale). 
135 For an introduction to the RGB in New York City, see generally 
COLLINS, supra note 132. 
136 For a list of factors the New York RGB considers, on which my 
proposal is based, see N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 26-510 (McKinney 2009). 
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tenant would have the option of a 1, 2 or 5 year lease, with 
annual increases set by the RGB. 
To protect the settled economic expectations of certain 
classes of tenants who desire long-term stability, an integral part 
of the RSP is a new rental subsidy modeled loosely on New 
York’s existing Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption.137 
Tenants under a specific income threshold, which I suggest be 
set at somewhere between 80-120% of the area median 
income,138 would be entitled to a federally funded rental 
subsidy139 to cover all rent increases from the initial registered 
rent (which include the allowable increase for that year as set by 
the RGB, as well as increases permissible for that specific 
building or unit due to improvements). In addition to the income 
                                                          
137 See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws. Law § 26-509 (Mckinney 2009); see also 
ANDREW SCHERER & FERN FISHER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW 
IN NEW YORK §4:305 (2008)  (summary of SCRIE law). 
138 I suggest that the RSP rental subsidy be provided to households with 
incomes at or below 80–120% of Area Median Income (AMI) for the 
following reasons: First, for the 80% ceiling, HUD defines low income as 
households at or below 80% of AMI and any low income household should 
be included in the rental subsidy. A higher threshold of eligibility for the 
RSP rental subsidy may be appropriate for areas which have exceptionally 
high housing costs—for example, the City of New York Housing 
Development Corporation has programs targeting households with incomes at 
or below 130% of AMI, recognizing that in such an expensive city, higher 
income households still need assistance with housing expenses. See New 
York City Hous. Dev. Corp., New Housing Opportunities Program—New 
HOP, http://www.nychdc.com/pdf/developers/new.hop.termsheet_2008.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (term sheet for the 2008 “New HOP” program). 
As background, the website for Freddie Mac defines “Area Median Income” 
as follows: “Midpoint in the family-income range for a metropolitan 
statistical area or for the non-metro parts of a state. The figure often is used 
as a basis to stratify incomes into low, moderate and upper ranges.” Cf. 
Adams, Homeownership, supra note 60, at 577 (quoting Census Department 
definition of Median income: “the amount which divides the income 
distribution into two equal groups, half having incomes above the median, 
half having incomes below the median”).  
139 Cf. BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, RETHINKING U.S. 
RENTAL HOUSING POLICY 8–9 (Harvard University Joint Center for Housing 
Studies 2007) (suggesting new pools of housing vouchers, akin to Section 8, 
to address rental needs in high cost areas). 
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threshold, receipt of the RSP rental subsidy would be available 
only to households who do not already receive Section 8 or 
other rental subsidies, and who affirm in a sworn statement that 
(i) the rent exceeded 30% of the household’s gross income for 
the year prior to lease renewal as reported on tax returns,140 and 
(ii) they expected that the household’s income would remain 
below the threshold income level for the coming year. Subsidies 
for the future years of the lease term would be subject to the 
tenant providing similar proof and affirmation to the RSP 
administrative entity. When the landlord takes a market based 
increase as allowed under the RSP (at the earlier of the fourth 
consecutive lease renewal or the tenth year from the date of the 
initial lease), then the rental subsidy would end. It may seem 
counterintuitive for the RSP rental subsidy to terminate at the 
point at which market based increases could be taken, since this 
is the very point at which households would be most 
vulnerable.141 However, ending the rental subsidy at this point is 
consistent with the RSP’s overall structure as a modest, time 
limited program which is designed to keep costs at a 
minimum.142 The opposite policy of allowing the rental subsidy 
to continue indefinitely would require the government to 
subsidize potentially unlimited rent increases. This would lead to 
budgetary challenges as well as a possible erosion of public 
support. 
B. The Fine Print: Legal/Administrative Structure of RSP 
The RSP is shaped to adapt to many of the urban rental 
                                                          
140 Households spending more than 30% of gross income on housing 
expenses are considered “rent burdened.” See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 
23. 
141 I would suggest that the RSP be accompanied with programs similar 
to those in effect in New York City protecting the elderly and disabled after 
RSP protections and subsidies expire. See generally COLLINS, supra note 127 
(describing the New York City Rent Guidelines Board and Rent Stabilization 
System).  
142 See infra Section V.C. 
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housing markets throughout the United States.143 There are 
important differences in these rental markets which impact not 
only whether a regime like the RSP is good policy, but also the 
exact contours the program should take.144 These decisions are 
best left to state and local legislatures. Some of the pertinent 
differences include the density of the locality,145 the kind and 
size of rental projects that exist in each community,146 and, with 
                                                          
143 Even among some rent regulation defenders, there is some debate as 
to whether it should apply outside of New York City. Interview with Marvin 
Markus., Chairman, Rent Guidelines Bd., held at Markus’ offices at 
Goldman Sachs on June 1, 2009). They point to New York City being unique 
in terms of the importance and expense of rental housing to that City. Ellen 
& O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 19–36, offer an interesting discussion on this 
question. They review the statistics comparing New York City to the nation’s 
nine other biggest cities as well as the nine other most dense cities in terms 
of percentage of persons who rent, the cost of housing, the length of the 
rentals, and the density. On the percentage of renters, with 70% New York 
City is at the top of the biggest cities, but is roughly equal to many smaller 
cities such as Patterson, Jersey City, San Francisco and Cambridge. 
Similarly, while New York City is near the top of the list in terms of cost of 
housing, it is not the highest and when compared with income, is more in the 
middle of the pack.  The only 2 categories analyzed in which New York City 
is an outlier is the level of density, and the length that New York City 
households remain in their apartments. Thirty Five percent of New York City 
renters remained in their apartments between 1990 and 2000, while the 
comparable number for the U.S. as a whole was under ten percent. Notably, 
none of the other 9 biggest cities exceeded 18%, and none of the other 9 
densest cities exceeded 23%. See id. at 32 & 51 tbl.711. 
144 There are a number of specific components of the rent stabilization 
portion of RSP that need fleshing out, for example whether to allow 
succession rights to units for cohabitating family members. As indicated 
infra, the time limited nature of the rent regulation makes these questions less 
crucial than under unlimited systems.  
145 See Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 31 (noting that localities 
might be more likely to try to promote residential stability in dense 
“residential environments [where the] development of trust and social capital 
among neighbors seems more critical”). 
146 See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, State of the Nation, supra note 
97, at 22 & tbl.W-7 (noting that less than 10% of rentals are in buildings 
with at least fifty units, more than a third of rental units are single-family 
homes, including condominiums, and more than half are in buildings with 
fewer than five apartments; also stating that “[s]ize is important because 
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respect to the households seeking rental accommodation, their 
ideal degree of mobility and economic make-up. For example, 
jurisdictions that have a very high percentage of owners and in 
which most renters are transitory or temporary may not want or 
need the RSP. On the other hand, these very communities many 
have pent up demand for rental units, which would emerge if 
more stable rental options were offered. Recall the study which 
found that more than 97% of all residential leases in non-
regulated markets are for one year or less.147  
Since states and localities would both be involved in 
implementing the RSP, legislative action at each level would be 
appropriate. I suggest state legislatures pass authorizing 
legislation that would enable, but not compel, localities to adopt 
the RSP within certain state prescribed programmatic 
parameters.148 Local governments would then choose whether or 
not to adopt the RSP and if so, exercise discretion to choose the 
best program within the state prescribed parameters. In addition, 
I suggest that one state agency be designated as the regulatory 
authority for each of the localities in the state that adopt the 
RSP.149 This would ensure consistent statewide application and 
enforcement of the RSP. That state agency could also supervise 
the RGB that sets annual cost based increases.150  
In addition, the use of federal funds for the RSP rent subsidy 
requires a programmatic vehicle for distributing these funds. I 
                                                          
[different sized] rental buildings differ systematically in location, year of 
construction, and types of households they attract”). 
147 Genesove, The Nominal Rigidity of Apartment Rents, supra note 124. 
148 See, e.g., N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8605 (McKinney’s 2009) (better 
known as the Urstadt Law, which prevents the City of New York from 
enacting rent regulation in a manner more restrictive than that authorized by 
the New York State Legislature). 
149 In New York State, the Division of Housing & Community Renewal 
is charged with this role. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, 
§ 2520.1 (2009) (recognizing powers granted under Chapter 888 of the Laws 
of New York of 1985). 
150 As opposed to the practice in the State of New York, in which each 
locality with rent regulation has its own rent setting board, I would suggest 
one statewide RGB, with members appointed by the Governor, the tenant 
community and the landlord community.  
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would suggest that the RSP rental subsidy funds be distributed 
by HUD as a block grant to each state.151 The amount provided 
to each state would be determined by the number of rental 
households in the state, a statistic gathered by the U.S. Census 
Bureau. States that choose not to implement the RSP could use 
the money for additional Section 8 Voucher Certificates, which 
are distributed to very low income households to assist in 
making rent payments.152 
C. RSP Evaluation & Discussion: Primary & Secondary 
Goals 
1. Primary Goal 
As stated above, the fundamental goal of the RSP is to 
enable renting households to obtain more housing stability. How 
will the results of the RSP match this goal? First, all renters 
would have the option of longer lease terms, up to five years, 
with rights to renew absent good cause for eviction by the 
owner. Second, all renters would be protected from market 
based rent increases (and low to moderate income households 
who are rent-burdened would be protected from all rent 
increases) for the shorter of ten years and the initiation of the 
fourth consecutive lease renewal. Taken together, these first two 
results meet my primary goal of providing more stable options 
for renting households. 
While the ten year limitation to the RSP’s rent benefits 
would undoubtedly be a material hardship for some households, 
there are compelling reasons to design the RSP in this way. 
First, ten years of rent protection and rent subsidy (for eligible 
households) provides families and individuals with sufficient 
                                                          
151 HUD administers a number of block grant programs which provide 
grants to the states for certain prescribed uses, within which the states have 
discretion to choose individual projects. The original program was the 
Community Development Block Grant Program, enacted by Congress in 
1974. See 24 C.F.R. 570.1 (2009). 
152 For a brief description of the Section 8 Voucher Program, see supra 
note 110. 
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time to settle in a community, attach roots, and begin to climb 
the economic ladder so that market-based rentals would not be 
out of reach.153 If a family moved into the RSP protected 
apartment when a child was eight, in third grade, the family’s 
housing would be protected until the child became 18 and 
scheduled to graduate from high school. Furthermore, most 
renting households, whether in jurisdictions with rent regulation 
or not, end up moving within ten years.154  The reform of the 
federal welfare programs in the 1990’s provides an apt analogy. 
These changes included eliminating a guarantee of eligibility for 
the main cash welfare program (Aid to Families With Dependent 
Children) as well as the addition or enhancement of other 
benefits, including job training, child care and other resources 
designed to enable recipient to gain increased economic 
independence.155 By some accounts, these reforms helped push 
                                                          
153 Cf. Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting 
Neighborhood Improvement while Protecting Low-Income Families, 8 URB. 
INST., OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP PROJECT 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/publications/311457.html (proposing 10 years as length 
of guarantee for tenants of expected future benefits from renter insurance 
product, discussed further infra Section VI.A). A valuable addition to RSP, 
one wise commentator suggested to this author, would be a forced savings 
program to run contiguously during the ten year period of rental regulation 
and rental subsidy. This would help ensure that households were indeed more 
able to afford market rents. Cf. Gale, supra note 16, at 1180–81 (proposing 
savings program to encourage low and moderate-income households to save 
for down payments as a part of a complete overhaul of the federal mortgage 
interest deduction). While devising such a program is beyond the scope of 
this paper, I note that the Obama Administration proposed a similar concept 
as part of the 2010 Federal Budget as an alternative to the 401(k) employee 
savings plans. See Pat Regnier, Why it’s Time to Create an Auto-IRA, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 27, 2009, http://moneyfeatures.blogs.money.cnn. 
com/2009/02/27/why-its-time-to-create-an-auto-ira/. 
154 See Ellickson, Legal Constraints, supra note 52, at 8 (“Over a ten 
year period, 83 percent of Chicago’s renting households changed dwellings, 
compared to 65 percent of New York [City]’s.”); see also William M. Rohe 
et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, JOINT CENTER FOR 
HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 13 (2001) (renters maintain their 
residences for a median duration of 2.1 years). 
155 See Ron Haskins, What Works is Work: Welfare Reform and Poverty 
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millions of Americans into the work force; they also took away 
much of the force of the conservative critiques of the existing 
federal welfare program.156 Similarly, limiting the RSP rent 
regulation and rental subsidy to ten years would likely push 
households to increase economic self-sufficiency, thereby 
helping to assuage potential conservative critics of the RSP.157  
More generally, the ten year limitation fits within the RSP’s 
overall structure as a modest program designed to have an 
acceptably limited impact on the budget constrained federal 
government as well as the applicable rental markets.158 The RSP 
is thus designed to work within the existing governmental and 
market parameters. The ten-year limitation thus increases the 
likelihood that an RSP type program will be adopted. The 
interest in rental housing demonstrated by the Obama 
Administration provides hope that the RSP will receive a 
sympathetic consideration in Washington.159 
The RSP’s ten-year limit on rent protection reveals another 
important point about what the RSP aims to achieve and what it 
doesn’t. The RSP is not aimed at creating affordable housing 
and should not be judged on such grounds. Why not? Because, 
the RSP, and rent regulation generally, are not the proper tools 
for creating or maintaining affordable housing for the long term. 
While this is contrary to the arguments of some tenant advocates 
and scholars,160 rent regulation regimes (including the RSP) are 
                                                          
Reduction, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 30 (2009). 
156 See id. at 46. 
157 The ten year limitation would help assuage the conservative critiques 
of government funded subsidy programs which are of an infinite duration. 
See, e.g., the critiques coming from Ronald Utt of the Heritage Foundation, 
objecting to Public Housing and Section 8 benefits as creating “a culture of 
dependency that doesn’t encourage families to work or to improve their lot in 
life.” Benson, supra note 2, at 4. 
158 The importance of the ten year limitation to RSP’s limited impact on 
markets is discussed more below.  
159 See Joseph Williams, President Shifts Focus to Renting, Not Owning, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2009 (detailing Administration’s plans to use 
stimulus funds to create more rental housing affordable to low and moderate 
income households). 
160 See Chester Hartman, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 
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too blunt to achieve the narrow tailoring that the most effective 
affordable housing programs demand.161 For example, empirical 
studies of New York City’s rent regulation have found that 
households with higher incomes are more likely to live in rent 
regulated housing as compared with low income households.162 
The fact that wealthy households benefit from rent regulation in 
addition to, or even more often than, poor households, does not 
necessarily mean that that rent regulation should be 
discontinued. Rather, it means that proponents of rent regulation 
(and the RSP) must be able to identify important goals served by 
such programs other than income redistribution.163 In this case, 
the RSP serves the crucial goal of increasing tenant stability.164 
The RSP is favorable to usual rent regulation schemes because it 
has a more limited effect on the overall rental market and 
because it features a federally funded rental subsidy which is 
restricted to low to moderate income households. 
While the RSP is not an affordable housing program, I 
strongly support increased funding of the Section 8 Voucher 
Program and other programs which enable low to moderate 
                                                          
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 463 (2003). 
161 See Edgar Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI. KENT 
L. REV. 931, 938–40 (1991) (detailing studies showing that benefits of rent 
regulation accumulate differently to different classes of people, and 
concluding that due to such random effects, rent regulation “has no merit as a 
redistributive device”).  
162 See Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 9; see also Barros, supra 
note 62, at 288. 
163 Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 28 (identifying income 
redistribution as one of the usual reasons for housing policy). 
164 This is the view of Marvin Markus, chair of the Rent Guidelines 
Board of New York City, who recently stated that New York City’s Rent 
Stabilization regime is important as a “guarantee of tenure system . . . its 
basic premise is not affordability. It is to protect the tenant in occupancy 
from illegal and large-scale gouging.” See Eliot Brown, Rent Board Chief 
Marvin Markus Pleads for ‘Rationality’, N.Y. OBSERVER, May 18, 2009, 
available at http://www.observer.com/2009/real-estate/rent-board-chief-
marvin-markus-pleads-rationality; see also Greg Smithsimon, Rent 
Regulation: The Right Tool for the Right Job, PLANETIZEN, May 14, 2007, 
http:// planetizen.com/node/24451 (suggesting that rent regulation’s purpose 
is to provide housing stability not affordable housing). 
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income households obtain decent housing at rents they can 
afford.165 Recent budget proposals and public statements by HUD 
Secretary Donovan indicate that more resources for rental 
housing are forthcoming.166 Increasing the strength of programs 
like the Section 8 Voucher Program is the ultimate answer for 
those households that are forced to move from the RSP-covered 
housing after the ten years and are unable to afford market 
rentals in acceptable areas. 
2. Secondary Goal 
Now I move to an evaluation of how the RSP serves my 
secondary goal, which is avoiding excessive distortions in rental 
housing markets and thereby maintaining market-based 
incentives for landlords. The formulation of this goal is partially 
based on sensible critiques of rent regulation.167 More 
                                                          
165 See generally Ed Koch & Robert Weiner, Renters Across America 
Need More Help from Congress, DAILY NEWS (New York City), July 5, 
2009, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/07/05/2009-
07-05_renters_across_america_need_more_help_from_congress.html 
#ixzz0KTdnOBHC&C.  
166 See, e.g., Eugene Gilligan, 90-Degree Turn: Stimulus Package 
Redirects Housing Efforts to Affordable Rentals, MULTI-HOUSING NEWS, 
Apr. 14, 2009  (describing how $13 billion in stimulus money is going to 
HUD’s budget, including $2.3 billion in the Tax Credit Assistance Program 
which will go to fill gaps in budgets for low income rental construction and 
rehabilitation projects); Sule Aygoren Carranza, Experts Look at Housing 
Under Obama Administration, GLOBEST.COM, Jan. 26, 2009, at 3, 
http://www.globest.com/news/1332_1332/insider/176529-1.html (discussing 
inclusion in stimulus bill of substantial resources to address multifamily rental 
housing); Secretary Shaun Donovan, 2009–10 Housing and Urban 
Development Budget (May 7, 2009) (stating that for too long there has been a 
federal homeownership policy at expense of a federal policy aimed at 
affordable rentals and detailing an increase in federal money for rental 
program, including increased Section 8 voucher funding).  
167 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of 
Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988). Epstein’s piece was the 
seminal article which drew 7 response papers, all printed in a volume of the 
Brooklyn Law Review. See id at 1215–80; see also William Tucker, How 
Rent Control Drives Out Affordable Housing, Cato Institute Policy Analysis 
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specifically, the consequences I seek to avoid or at least 
minimize with the RSP include the following: (i) disincentivizing 
the creation and maintenance of rental housing;168 (ii) creating 
                                                          
No. 274 (May 21, 1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
274.html (stating that cities that do not use rent control policies are 
“rewarded with a normal competitive housing market in which housing is 
available at every price level but [t]hose cities that succumb to the disease of 
rent control are doomed to never-ending, house-to-house warfare over an 
ever-diminishing supply of unaffordable housing”); Michael H. Schill, 
Comment on Chester Hartman and David Robinson’s Evictions: The Hidden 
Housing Problem, Protection or Protraction?, 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
503, 513 (2003) (to properly address society housing problems, reforms must 
work with the market system, and not it against it); c.f. Andrea B. Carroll, 
The International Trend Toward Requiring Good Cause for Tenant Eviction: 
Dangerous Portents for the United States, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 427, 446 
n.139 (2008) (making the case against adopting good cause requirements for 
eviction, which are often but not always accompanied by rent regulation). But 
see Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHILOSOPHY & 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 350, 365 (Autumn 1986) (“A tenancy, no less than a single-
family house, is the sort of property interest in which a person becomes self-
invested; and after the self-investment has taken place, retention of the 
interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible interests 
of others.”). But see Michael J. Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants?: 
A Reply to Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1267, 1273–74) (“It seems clear that 
rent control is not a perverse public policy which hurts everyone. There are 
winners and there are losers, and it is important to identify who is who. On 
the landlord side the losers are people who owned rental housing at the time 
the original rent control law was passed, and the winners are builders of new 
apartments . . . . On the tenant side, the elderly and long-term stable 
households benefit from the low levels of their original rent. People just 
entering the rental market and renters who move frequently tend to pay 
higher rents . . . or face long housing searches. Often this means that low-
income households do not receive as much protection from rent regulation.”); 
Alyssa Katz, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 189 (2009) 
(“[I]t’s impossible to make a blanket case for or against rent control . . . the 
success or failure depends on gathering good information, exercising the 
political will to calibrate the annoying details of administration and taking 
leadership to reconcile conflict.”); Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement 
of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (property 
decisions involve “plural values” and cannot be “adequately understood or 
analyzed through a single metric”). 
168 See Epstein, supra note 167, at 763–67 (criticizing rent control 
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rules that are difficult for governments to administer or for 
owners and tenants to understand and comply with;169 
(iii) creating opportunities for abuse, or for shadow rental 
markets to emerge; and (iv) incentivizing  landlords and tenants 
to dispute and litigate.170 
                                                          
regimes for, among other reasons, creating disincentives for housing 
production and maintenance); see also Tucker, supra note 167, at 162. 
However, the empirical case regarding the effects of rent regulation on new 
construction and housing maintenance are disputed. See Ellen & O’Flaherty, 
supra note 49, at 24 (citing various studies and concluding that “models that 
forecast the effects of rent control and rental subsidies on the costs 
of . . . uncontrolled rental housing . . . are extremely complex and do not 
give unambiguous answers”);  J. Gilderbloom & R. Appelbaum, RETHINKING 
RENTAL HOUSING 57–67 (1988) (citing numerous studies of landlord behavior 
and rental housing markets and finding a minimal effect of rent regulation on 
levels of new construction and maintenance of existing housing); Kenneth K. 
Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore A Free Market, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1989) (citing numerous studies from the 
1970s and 1980s, including many commissioned by governments, and 
concluding that the reports that included data “on new apartment construction 
in rent controlled jurisdictions have been mixed in their conclusions”); Olsen, 
supra note 163, at 942–43 (“[T]he effect of rent control on the maintenance 
of the controlled [housing] stock is ambiguous on theoretical 
grounds . . . [and] the empirical literature contains no compelling 
evidence.”); Collins, supra note 133, at 22 (finding that “New York [City’s] 
two great housing booms . . . occurred during periods when strict rent 
controls were imposed on existing units”); see also Peter D. Salins, 
Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 775, 779 (1988) (opponents of rent regulation who make 
this argument [as to inefficiency] have also relied too heavily on theory, and 
too little on empirical proof); see also id. at 780 (“[N[o one has yet 
discovered the research design that will succeed in definitively making the 
deregulation case.”). 
169 For an example of a well intentioned scheme that may be 
administratively difficult see Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home 
Dwellers: Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
277, 307 (2006) (suggesting that, when considering an eviction, a decision 
maker evaluate various prescribed factors to assess the degree to which a 
subsidized tenant considers a dwelling to be a home and if so indicated, “the 
burden should shift to the opposing stakeholder to justify the basis for 
eviction”). 
170 See Michael J. Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants? A Reply to 
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For this secondary goal, avoiding the above-described 
unintended consequences, the RSP serves its purpose well, albeit 
not perfectly. Generally, the RSP seeks to combine the best 
aspects of existing rent regulation systems and rental subsidy 
programs, with certain additions suggested by the commercial 
leasing framework, specifically longer lease options with 
periodic step up rent increases. Specifically, the RSP would 
avoid unintended consequences by creating a stock of rental 
units priced at or near market rents. Units would be priced at or 
near market because under the RSP landlords could take market 
increases, at a minimum, every ten years, as well as annual 
increases to cover increased costs in maintaining and improving 
their buildings. The protection for tenants is from market 
increases during their tenancy, up to their fourth lease renewal 
or ten years.  By making the rent regulation time limited and 
subjecting all units in a jurisdiction to its purview, the RSP 
                                                          
Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1989) (“I agree with Epstein that 
rent control leads to increased litigation between landlords and tenants. In 
fact, the primary negative effect of rent regulation, from the viewpoint of 
landlords, seems to be that it enmeshes them in a bureaucracy designed to 
regulate housing prices, housing quality, and landlord-tenant relations.”). 
Other critiques of rent control include the following: (i) it leads to the 
misallocation of space (see Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The 
Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6220, October 1997); Richard A. Epstein, 
Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 
1281, 1289-90 (1988); (ii) that it is arbitrary, (iii) difficult to remove once 
enacted and introduces politics into housing markets; and (iv) that it is a poor 
toll for redistributing wealth. My response to these potential critiques of RSP 
is as follows: (i) I agree that households which change in size during the ten 
year maximum of rent regulation will have incentives to keep the unit and not 
move to the appropriate sized unit, but given the important goals served by 
RSP and the time limitation of this incentive, I am not terribly concerned; 
(ii) RSP, by incorporating an income restricted rental subsidy, attempts to 
address this arbitrariness; (iii) while it is important to consider the political 
economy of rent regulation systems, as Epstein reminds us, like (i) above, in 
light of the important goals furthered by RSP, ultimately this should not stop 
any jurisdiction from adopting such a regime; (iv) I agree but as described 
above, RSP is not aimed at wealth distribution but rather household and 
neighborhood stability. 
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would eliminate much of the difference in rents charged to 
existing and new tenants. This is an important and positive 
change to most existing rent regulation schemes, since it reduces 
the current incentives for landlords to harass tenants into 
leaving. The decreased harassment would likely reduce the 
amount of landlord-tenant litigation, which in turn would reduce 
the state’s administrative burden. Similarly, the ten-year limit on 
rent regulation would greatly reduce the benefit of passing the 
housing unit to a relative, and therefore the battles over 
succession rights would be reduced. In addition, in another 
positive change for landlord tenant relations, the RSP’s rent 
subsidy for income and rent-burdened households would come at 
the expense of the federal government and not landlords. 
Finally, as an ancillary benefit, the federal funds for the RSP 
rental subsidies would take one step towards achieving a more 
balanced allocation of federal benefits allocated to renters and 
owners. 
D. RSP: Addressing Critiques & Concerns  
The most basic question is why the RSP is needed. If it were 
true, as Richard Epstein asserted in 1989, that those seeking 
increased residential stability could simply purchase homes 
instead of renting,171 then this would be a short paper indeed. 
However, Epstein made this assertion prior to the foreclosure 
crisis, and I am not sure that he would repeat the statement 
today.172 It is evident from my arguments thus far that there are 
                                                          
171 See Epstein, supra note 167, at 1293 (“So long as the market is well 
functioning, then persons who desire to have long-term attachments to 
property can buy instead of rent.”).  
172 However, Epstein has stated that much of the expense of housing 
results from unneeded and unconstitutional government interference in the 
housing market through building codes and zoning restrictions. See Epstein, 
supra note 9, at 1287. It is possible that Epstein would argue that, free of 
such constraints, the market would produce housing at all price points. While 
such an assertion has a certain ideological appeal for Epstein, it would mean 
that government would allow housing to be of questionable quality and 
standard. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 37 (“It is not certain that the 
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a certain percentage of households that simply do not have the 
economic ability to be homeowners, no matter their desire for 
stability.173 
The more nuanced question is why renters who desire 
increased stability do not negotiate for longer lease terms. There 
is some disagreement among wise minds on this question. 
Robert Ellickson asserts that landlords cannot find tenants to 
take the longer leases,174 while Professors Fennell & Roin posit 
that landlords are fearful of such arrangements since tenants 
have significantly less at stake to hold them to the lease terms, 
specifically just a security deposit, while landlords are compelled 
to comply by the tenants’ presence and the availability of court 
protection.175 Neither Ellickson nor Fennell & Roin cite 
empirical findings to support their respective propositions but I 
am inclined to join Fennell & Roin on this point, especially with 
respect to tenants at the lower-end of the economic spectrum. As 
                                                          
removal of such [building code] restrictions would make housing affordable 
to the lowest income households . . . society may not accept the changes in 
building and community standards that would be necessary if housing costs 
were to be reduced to such levels.”). The regulation of single room 
occupancy or “flophouse” hotels in New York City and San Francisco in the 
1970s is one example of the tensions governments must weigh between trying 
to improving housing conditions and eliminating the market altogether. See 
Supportive Housing Network of NY, What is Supportive Housing? available 
at http://www.shnny.org/what_is_history.html (“SRO hotels in New York 
City were particularly vulnerable to conversion or demolition because of a 
city tax abatement program  . . . [which] created incentives for converting 
SRO units into market-rate apartments, commercial hotels, or offices. Federal 
urban renewal programs like Title I also led to the condemnation and 
demolition of the SRO stock, particularly in midtown Manhattan.”). 
173 See supra Part IV.B. 
174 See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 951 (1991) (“A residential tenant could also stave 
off the risk of a rent increase by negotiating a long-term lease; in practice, 
however, residential landlords, not tenants, typically push to lengthen 
leases.”). 
175  See Lee Ann Fennell & Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes 15 
(Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper 
No. 477, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1452887 [hereinafter Fennell & Roin, Controlling]. 
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demonstrated in Section IV, because of the disparities in supply 
and demand, low-income tenants have little leverage for decent 
units priced at rents they can afford. Therefore, I suspect that 
the landlords are dictating the lease terms in such cases. This 
strongly implies that landlords are reluctant to enter into longer-
term leases, since 97% of the leases in non-regulated markets 
are for less than a year.176 
RSP would also face critiques from scholars, like Ellickson 
who have questioned the need for rent protection to increase 
rental stability. Ellickson states, “[r]ather than opportunistically 
exploiting tenants who have put down roots, landlords instead 
seem to give them price breaks.”177 While it makes sense for 
landlords to give some price break to long-term tenants who are 
proven reliable, public policy cannot rely on such whimsical and 
haphazard protection for a matter as dire as rental stability. 
Indeed, if we could rely on landlords to maintain reasonable 
rents for long-term tenants, landlords would not object to current 
“moderate” rent regulation statutes, which allow for periodic 
rental increases.178 If Ellickson’s statement were the full story, 
                                                          
176 See Genesove, supra note 124, at 123. It does seem reasonable that 
some rental households are reluctant to sign long term leases, which require 
them to pay for the unit without any “out” clause for changed economic or 
personal circumstances. This assumed reluctance on the part of tenants might 
be somewhat addressed by having the rental subsidy proposed by RSP for 
income challenged tenants, as well as having reasonable rights to assign 
and/or sublease the unit. For RSP, I would incorporate the New York State 
Real Property Law Section 226-b. This law provides that a residential tenant 
may not assign his/her lease without the written consent of the owner, unless 
the lease expressly provides otherwise. It also provides that a tenant has the 
right to sublet his/her apartment, even if subletting is prohibited in the lease, 
provided that the tenant complies strictly with the provisions of the statute, 
which requires detailed notice to owner. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b 
(2006).  
177 See Ellickson, supra note 174, at 951 (“Contrary to their unsavory 
reputations, residential landlords are not apt to jack up the real rents charged 
sitting tenants. Olsen cites five studies that indicate that longtime tenants tend 
to pay lower rents than do more recently arrived tenants who move into 
comparable housing units.”). 
178 See Mandel, supra note 165, at 1269–70 (distinguishing “strict” rent 
control systems “which do not allow pass-throughs of rising operating costs, 
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rent regulation would simply enforce what landlords would be 
doing anyway.  The vehemence of the landlord’s objection to 
rent regulation disproves this potential objection to the RSP.  
Landlords subject to rent regulations that currently exempt 
new units from regulation179 would, at least initially, object to 
the RSP requirement of having rents on new units regulated. 
However, this is a crucial feature of the RSP since it would 
result in substantially one class of tenants and owners, 
eliminating the two tiered or “shadow markets” phenomenon 
occurring under rent stabilization that Epstein and others 
decry.180 More nuanced critics and landlords will focus not on 
the fact of regulation, but the nature of regulation. Under the 
RSP all units must be registered and the initial rents will be set 
by the market. Similarly, at year ten, or when the tenant vacates 
or initiates his or her fourth lease renewal, the landlord would 
be able to take a market increase. In between day one and year 
ten (at the latest), landlords could take increases for increased 
costs and repairs. While far from the unregulated market 
preferred by Epstein and the landlord lobby, the RSP does not 
impose unreasonable controls.  
                                                          
[resulting in landlords finding that] it may become unprofitable to maintain or 
even keep the building, which leads to abandonment” and “moderate” rent 
control, which “allow[s] regulated rents to rise with inflation and increased 
operating costs” noting that moderate rent control laws are much more 
common than strict rent control and not bad policy); see also GILDERBLOOM 
& APPELBAUM, supra note 168, at 128–132 (distinguishing “strict” rent 
control which sets price limits without guaranteeing any right of return from 
moderate rent control, as defined by Mandel, and “strong” rent control, 
which was in effect in the 1980s in Santa Monica, Berkley and West 
Hollywood, which allow increases lower than the Consumer Price Index and 
no vacancy decontrol). 
179 Most current regulation programs exempt new construction from 
regulation. This includes the programs in New York City, as well as all of 
the California jurisdictions which have rent regulation. See Katz, supra note 
5, at 192. 
180 See Epstein, Rent Control Revisited, supra note 170, at 1287 (“[I]t is 
not possible to run a well-functioning two-tiered market, with some 
deregulated and some regulated units.”); see also Tucker, supra note 167, at 
3–4 (discussing shadow markets). 
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This leads us to consider another likely critique from 
landlords in jurisdictions with no rent regulation or good cause 
eviction laws. Such landlords could object to the interference of 
government in their market. However, the RSP rests on solid 
legal and programmatic precedent.181 Operating residential rental 
housing in urban areas is a highly regulated enterprise, whether 
or not rent regulation applies. Governments must be finely 
attuned to the external effects of land uses, given the high levels 
of density in urban areas.182 Therefore, owners of such 
properties are familiar with government regulation in a number 
of contexts.183 Almost all owners are subject to building code 
regulations and most are subject to zoning constraints as to the 
type of building and size of buildings that are allowed.184 In 
addition, several states and many localities restrict owners’ 
rights to evict only for prescribed “good cause.”185 Finally, 
many states and localities restrict owners’ ability to convert units 
to condominium or cooperative status.186  
Finally, there is no doubt that the RSP will come with 
administrative costs. My proposal suggests that, in order to 
ensure consistent statewide application, each state designate an 
agency as the regulatory authority for each of the localities that 
                                                          
181 See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding Washington 
D.C. rent regulation scheme from constitutional attack); Pennell v. City of 
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (following Block v. Hirsch); Rent Stabilization 
Ass’n v. Higgins, 83 N.Y.2d 156 (1993) (citing Block v. Hirsch as good 
law). 
182 See Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 31 (noting that localities 
might be more likely to try to promote residential stability through regulation 
in dense “residential environments [where t]he development of trust and 
social capital among neighbors seems more critical”). 
183 See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]enant/landlord laws and 
regulations govern the obligation of the property owner to meet certain 
standards of service provision and process concerning . . . eviction . . . . 
[Also] zoning, building and health codes along with other land use regulations 
impose responsibilities on owners . . . or otherwise place limitations on the 
use of an owner occupied property.”). 
184 See Baar, supra note 168, at 1234–35. 
185 See Roisman, supra note 73, at 834–35. 
186 See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Condominiums § 16.  
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adopt the RSP. Said state agency would also supervise the RGB 
that sets annual cost based increases. The exact costs to state 
government in administering the RSP would depend on a variety 
of factors, including the number and population size of the 
localities which adopt the RSP, the number of complaints and 
disputes to be adjudicated and other factors. It is likely that there 
would be a fairly significant amount of resources needed at the 
commencement of the RSP; from then on a professional staff at 
the agency would likely suffice. Localities could consider 
funding the RSP through user fees assessed against landlords 
and/or tenants, or through general purpose tax revenues. 
When calculating whether to adopt the RSP, sophisticated 
states and localities would focus on the potential benefits in 
addition to the administrative costs. The benefits of the RSP 
would be increased stability for tenant households and the 
accompanying spillover benefits to the surrounding communities. 
These include an increase in citizen participation in the 
community, better maintenance of their houses, and lower rates 
of neighborhood crime.187  
In conclusion, the goals served by the RSP—increasing 
tenant and neighborhood stability—outweigh the costs and 
potential inefficiencies of the program.  
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RSP 
Happily, I am far from alone in concluding that the current 
state of housing policy needs substantial revision to assist rental 
and owner households. Below are three examples of innovative 
new approaches to housing policy formed in response to the 
current crisis.  While all three offer some improvement over the 
current system, I argue that they all fall short of the RSP in 
terms of alleviating housing instability. 
A. Rental Insurance 
Robert Lerman & Aigne-Mary McKernan have promoted the 
                                                          
187 See supra Section II.C. 
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development of a financial risk or hedge product, which would 
enable renters to buy protection against future rent increases, 
based on some composite index of rents in the applicable 
neighborhood or market.188 Their approach builds on the work of 
Robert Shiller, who assisted in developing markets which enable 
homeowners and other traders to purchase and sell insurance 
tied to reductions in area house prices.189 Lerman & McKernan 
seek to extend such a concept to renters. 
The authors argue that such an approach is preferable to rent 
regulations or rent subsidies. They cite the usual arguments 
against rent regulations, namely that such regulation reduces 
property owners’ incentives to maintain property and to invest in 
added housing thereby “inducing shortages and higher prices for 
uncontrolled units.” As to rent subsidies, the authors object to 
the fact that subsidies in gentrifying neighborhoods will exceed 
those in lower income areas. They argue that their approach 
“improves on rent control and some subsidy approaches by 
divorcing the compensation (for area rent increases) from the 
renter’s subsequent choice of locations.”190 
The idea proposed by Lerman & McKernan has a number of 
elegant features. Most notably, after the market for such rental 
insurance is created and perfected, government’s role can be 
relatively minor. Indeed, regulating the market for such a 
product should be much less involved than the administrative 
role under the RSP in setting rent increases, monitoring 
compliance and settling disputes. Furthermore, it creates no 
incentives for conflict between landlords and tenants. 
For all its theoretical advantages, however, the proposed 
rental insurance product raises a number of unanswered 
questions and concerns. First, who would pay for such a product 
                                                          
188 See Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting 
Neighborhood Improvement while Protecting Low Income Families, 8 URBAN 
INST., May 2007, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311457_ 
Promoting_Neighborhood.pdf. 
189 See Robert Schiller, Mortgages of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21view. 
html. 
190 See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 188, at 2.  
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for low and moderate-income households?191 Second, the 
complexity of the product proposed is worrisome.192 The product 
seems difficult to create: it requires an extremely accurate 
measure of rents down to a fairly granular level—zip code. It is 
questionable whether reliable data for this index currently exists. 
Even more problematic, the complexity of the product seems to 
limit its usefulness for the intended beneficiaries, at least those 
without a high degree of financial sophistication. As we have 
seen from the subprime mortgage example, devising complex 
financial products for low to moderate-income households 
regarding their housing situation is fraught with risk. In this 
case, the success of the insurance product depends on renters 
choosing the right amount of coverage—not an easy task. 
Perhaps these concerns can be addressed. For now, it 
suffices to say that the RSP is a more viable program. No new 
markets or inventions are needed and the households that are the 
intended beneficiaries will be protected by a legal system that is 
administered by a government agency specifically charged with 
its enforcement. 
B. Requiring Good Cause For Eviction 
In her recent article,193 Florence Roisman identifies the lack 
of restriction on landlords’ abilities to evict or fail to renew 
leases as the primary problem for tenants. She advocates for 
courts, through common law contract doctrines, to enact a 
requirement that landlords have good cause before evictions. She 
notes that protected tenancies should not be restricted to those 
who can “negotiate long-term leases” but to all.194 
Roisman clearly shares my goals of providing additional 
stability for rental households, however, she does not address 
                                                          
191 See Fennell & Roin, Controlling, supra note 175, at 19. 
192 See id. at 19-22 (attempting to develop the proposal that Lerman & 
McKernan sketched out, acknowledging a number of unanswered questions 
and logistical difficulties). 
193 Roisman, supra note 73. 
194 Id. at 829. 
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whether or how tenants would be shielded from eviction 
resulting from an inability to pay for rent increases. The RSP 
incorporates Roisman’s central point by requiring as an essential 
component that landlords have good cause to evict or fail to 
renew a lease. The RSP goes further by addressing the economic 
side of the equation: specifically the RSP offers all tenants a 
certain degree of rental protection for ten years, and to those 
who are low- to moderate-income and rent burdened, a subsidy 
to cover the allowable increases.195 
C. New Models of Homeownership 
Lee Ann Fennell of the University of Chicago Law School 
has offered one of the most creative proposals aimed at 
reforming the current model of homeownership, called 
Homeownership 2 or H2.0.196 H2.0 is designed to enable 
aspiring homebuyers to purchase a home but limit the extent of 
their investment (and risk of loss) to factors within the 
homeowner’s control.  Specifically, H2.0 seeks to allocate to 
homeowners the profit and loss properly tied to the condition 
                                                          
195 There are of course other rental models that could be considered. One 
interesting example is that of Sweden, described in detail in One Nation’s 
Dream, Another’s Realty: Housing Justice In Sweden, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
63, 94–96 (1996). In Sweden, the government plays a much more significant 
role in the rental market than in the U.S., significantly more than even those 
jurisdictions under rent control. Construction and operation of most rental 
housing in Sweden is financed by the government and therefore the rent 
setting process and admissions process is heavily controlled by the 
government as well. Among other aspects, Swedish tenants are protected 
from eviction by good cause requirements and prospective tenants obtain 
newer apartments by waiting list. Furthermore, “[r]ents are determined on an 
annual basis pursuant to negotiations between the municipal housing 
corporations and tenants’ associations.” Id. at 94–95. Kenn finds much to 
admire in the Swedish model, but the amount of subsidies and degree of 
governmental involvement required do not make it a good fit for the current 
political and economic system in the United States. See also Roisman, supra 
note 73, at 856 (“The provision of decent, affordable housing for poor people 
is not an area for private enterprise. It is a government 
responsibility . . . .”). 
196 See Fennell, supra note 8. 
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and improvements made to the house and site-specific factors 
they can control.  The risk and reward attributable to local off-
site factors (schools, crime rates, neighborhood amenities) as 
well as broader economic risks (real estate prices, economic 
cycles) would be purchased by a market of investors.197 Thus, 
Fennell envisions a new option for homebuyers—the right to 
purchase a home and keep the equity based on payments made 
and improvements to the house and site but to avoid the broader 
economic investment that is currently required.198 
Fennell’s proposal has a great deal of promise. I believe that 
she accurately posits that a significant percentage of prospective 
homebuyers would be interested in exchanging some of the 
potential upside of their home investment for a product that 
limits the potential downside as well. This is especially likely in 
turbulent real estate market cycles such as the current one. 
Indeed, if it could be perfected, H2.0 could be the kind of tool 
that gets prospective buyers “off the sideline” as has been the 
common refrain among real estate professionals and many 
                                                          
197 See id. at 1072. 
198 As Fennell discusses, H2.0 is a variation on a more traditional shared 
equity or shared appreciation type of homeownership program. See id. In 
such a program, a public or private entity contributes part of the upfront cost 
of purchasing a home. In exchange, such investor entity shares in any future 
house appreciation. Public investors, usually municipal governments, use 
such appreciation to enable low to moderate income households to purchase 
the house when it is put up for re-sale. See id. at 1064–66. In Australia, a 
privately created product called the Equity Finance Mortgage uses future 
house appreciation to replace monthly payments on a second position loan 
that is made to enable the household to afford the downpayment. See Equity 
Finance Mortgage, http://www.efm.info/pdf/EFMBrochureV3.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2009). When the household sells the property or refinances, 
it must repay the principal balance of the second loan plus up to a 40% share 
of any increase in the value of the property. See id. Other intriguing 
proposals to revise the current model of homeownership include Robert 
Schiller’s idea of the continually adjusting mortgage. This mortgage product, 
to be offered by banks, would reduce defaults by automatically adjusting 
payments due each month according to fluctuations in the economic and real 
estate markets. See Robert Schiller, Mortgages of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/09/21/business/21view.html. 
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economists in recent months. H2.0 has the additional promise of 
maintaining the economic incentives for homeowners to improve 
their property as well as the local conditions under their control. 
This adds a layer of sophistication to her proposal. 
However, H2.0 does not seek to address the crisis 
experienced by millions of households who are seeking more 
affordable and stable rental options.199 Indeed, by excluding 
rental housing from its purview, I fear that H2.0 continues the 
emphasis on homeownership as the Holy Grail for both 
household satisfaction and economic recovery.  To achieve the 
balance between homeownership and rental programs, I would 
urge adoption of the RSP or other rental programs as a 
complement to H2.0. 
CONCLUSION 
Our current polices of prioritizing homeownership to the 
exclusion of the needs of rental households have failed. We as a 
society need to stop over subsidizing and promoting 
homeownership as the only model for successful American 
households. Changes to policy are particularly urgent now as 
millions of Americans have been forced from homeownership 
into rental housing as a result of the foreclosure crisis and the 
economic recession.  
The RSP offers one step towards reclaiming an equilibrium 
in government preferences between homeownership and renting. 
By enabling households to achieve stability while renting, the 
RSP provides benefits for those households and also their 
neighbors and larger communities. While the specific contours 
of the RSP are subject to further conversation, this paper makes 
                                                          
199 Fennell and her colleague Julie Roin, propose revising the incentives 
for both renters and homeowners. They seek to right size the incentives of 
both understaked households, renters and homeowners with no or negative 
equity, and “overstaked” homeowners who oppose sensible zoning ordinances 
and other neighborhood changes. See generally Fennell & Roin, Controlling, 
supra note 175. The authors urge that local governments have an important 
stake in such “right staking” and, subject to state constitutional constraints, 
engage in such efforts. 
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clear that the conversation regarding our national housing policy 
needs to be amended to include the needs of renters. 
 
